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New Title IX regulations mandate an adversarial school hearing to
resolve formal Title IX complaints of sexual misconduct involving college
students. The new regulations adopt an unprecedented approach to the
admission of evidence in these hearings. In particular, schools can admit
only statements, including medical reports and other documents, by
parties and witnesses who have submitted to full and live crossexamination. This approach departs sharply from both the due process
requirements and practices for public school student discipline and
administrative hearings, and the rules for admissibility of evidence in civil
and even criminal trials. An analysis of the evidentiary standards under
the new regulations identifies a myriad of issues that are not clearly
resolved. Some issues are addressed but not authoritatively resolved by
non-binding agency guidance; many other issues remain unsettled or
unaddressed. The analysis suggests practices for schools to adopt and
places the new Title IX evidentiary approach in context by comparing it
with evidence standards in other legal contexts.
President Biden criticized the new regulations and promised “a quick
end” to them, but the same years-long notice and comment process used
to enact regulations is required for repeal or revision. In the context of
future modification, which apparently will begin with proposed new
regulations in May 2022, the new regulations’ approach to the admission
of evidence is evaluated using the lens of the agency’s stated goals: due
process and fairness for respondents, equal treatment of complainants
and respondents, the centrality of credibility assessment, and the reality
that schools are not courtrooms and decision-makers in hearings are
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neither trained judges nor attorneys. The new regulations fail to achieve
these goals. Due process does not require the ban on uncross-examined
statements. The ban fetishizes cross-examination to assess credibility
while ignoring other common and important impeachment techniques.
Its adoption is part of a conspicuous pattern: the new regulations borrow
general evidentiary approaches from the rules for trial, and then modifies
them in ways that disfavor complainants and provide protection for
respondents that equal or exceed trial protections for criminal defendants.
The new regulations adopt the general ban on hearsay for trials but do
not adopt any of the trial rules’ many exceptions—even those that would
admit hearsay against criminal defendants. The new regulations also
create a rape shield barring evidence of complainant sexual history and
character, modeled on the approach for criminal trials. Unlike the
criminal rape shield, the Title IX rape shield eliminates protection for the
sexual history of other victims of sexual misconduct by the respondent and
even requires the school to disclose the complainant’s protected sexual
history information to the respondent prior to the hearing. There are
fairer and better alternatives that are appropriate to the nature of school
hearings with non-attorney decision-makers. For example, the normal
approach in school hearings and administrative hearings is to focus on
weight rather than admissibility; admitting almost all evidence, while
allowing the parties to argue that a piece of evidence’s hearsay status
means that the decision-maker should give it little or no weight. The new
regulations’ evidentiary approach for resolving formal Title IX complaints
does not offer fairness to the parties, and complainants should not assume
that filing formal Title IX complaints serves their interests.
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IV.

I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX1 prohibits gender discrimination by schools that receive
federal education funds. Sexual harassment, including but not limited
to sexual assault (hereinafter collectively referred to as “sexual
misconduct”), is a form of gender discrimination and has been the
subject of much litigation and guidance from the U.S. Department of
Education (“DOE”).2 However, neither Title IX’s statutory text nor its
regulations specifically addressed sexual misconduct until new
regulations became effective in August 2020.3

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60 (1992); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,034–38 (May 19, 2020)
[hereinafter Preamble] (reviewing 1997–2017 DOE guidance, DCLs, and Q&As on sexual
harassment).
3 See Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,028–29.
1
2
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Longstanding Title IX regulations require schools to offer an
internal grievance process for Title IX complaints generally that
provides “prompt and equitable” resolution.4 Similarly, longstanding
regulations under the Clery Act,5 which applies to certain offenses
covered by the new Title IX regulations,6 require “prompt, fair, and
impartial” hearings.7 The new Title IX regulations establish a novel and
specific process for schools to follow when responding to formal
complaints of sexual misconduct.8 Schools must investigate formal
complaints and share the evidence gathered in the investigation with
the parties.9 At the college level, the complaint is resolved in a formal
adversarial hearing conducted in accordance with specific rules of
evidence.10 The agency explains that its new process and the rules of
evidence focus on providing due process11 and fundamental fairness for
accused students (termed “respondents” in the new regulations) and
“equal” treatment of respondents and victims (termed “complainants”
in the new regulations).12 Critics argue the new process is based on the

4 Compare former 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1980) (“A recipient shall adopt and publish
grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and
employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part.”) with
34 C.F.R. § 106.8(c) (2020) (“Adoption of grievance procedures. A recipient must adopt
and publish grievance procedures that provide for the prompt and equitable resolution
of student and employee complaints alleging any action that would be prohibited by this
part and a grievance process that complies with §106.45 for formal complaints as
defined in §106.30.”).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
6 Id. (listing covered offenses—domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault,
and stalking).
7 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(k)(2)(i).
8 See generally 34 C.F.R. § 106.45.
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
11 See infra Section III.B. Notably, the procedural requirements apply equally to
private schools, against whom students do not have constitutional due process rights.
12 Along these lines, treatment of a complainant or respondent may be actionable.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(a) (“[R]ecipient’s treatment of a complainant or a respondent in
response to a formal complaint of sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on
the basis of sex under title IX.”). Staff involved in investigations, hearings, and other
meetings and proceedings must not exhibit bias toward complainants or respondents.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii) (“[A]ny individual designated by a recipient as a Title IX
Coordinator, investigator, decision-maker, or any person designated by a recipient to
facilitate an informal resolution process, [must] not have a conflict of interest or bias for
or against complainants or respondents generally or an individual complainant or
respondent.”). Training materials “used to train Title IX Coordinators, investigators,
decision-makers, and any person who facilitates an informal resolution process, must
not rely on sex stereotypes and must promote impartial investigations and
adjudications of formal complaints of sexual harassment . . . .” Id.

DAGGETT (DO NOT DELETE)

6

10/28/21 4:02 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

rape myth of false accusations13 and does not provide equal treatment
to victims. The new regulations are currently under challenge on a
myriad of grounds in lawsuits brought by the ACLU, the State of New
York, a coalition of state attorneys general, and the Victim Rights Law
Center.14
The new Title IX regulations adopt an unprecedented approach to
evidence in college hearings. In particular, schools must exclude all
statements made by parties and witnesses who do not submit to full
cross-examination at the hearing as to evidence used to determine
responsibility.15 The new approach departs significantly from other
proceedings, including: school hearings for public school student
discipline and for other Title IX and Clery Act matters, administrative
hearings, and civil and criminal trials.16
Part II offers an analysis of the new evidentiary standards. The new
regulations do not resolve many issues; some are addressed but not
authoritatively resolved17 by a non-binding Preamble of more than 500

13 See, e.g., Suzannah C. Dowling, (Un)Due Process: Adversarial Cross-Examination in
Title IX Adjudications, 73 ME. L. REV. 123, 139 (2021) (citing comments by a senior agency
employee repeating rape myths about frequent false allegations of rape); id. at 144–148
(arguing that cross-examination in rape hearings and trials weaponize rape myths and
led to enactment of rape shields).
14 See, e.g., New York v. Dep’t of Educ., 477 F. Supp. 3d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2020);
Pennsylvania v. DeVos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 47 (D.D.C. 2020); Know Your IX v. DeVos, No. 20cv-01224, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194288 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020); Complaint, Victim Rts. L.
Ctr. v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-11104, 2020 WL 5700819 (D. Mass. June 10, 2020). In the Victim
Rights Law Center case, a federal trial court found the new regulations’ ban on uncrossexamined statements arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104, 2021 WL 3185743,
at *16 (D. Mass. July 28, 2021). The court later clarified that it was vacating the ban
generally, and not only with regard to the parties. Order, Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona,
No. 20-cv-11104 (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2021), https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/massachusetts/madce/1:2020cv11104/222276/186/0.pdf. Most recently, the
DOE issued a guidance letter indicating it would not administratively enforce the ban.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Dear Students, Educators, and Other
Stakeholders Letter re Victim Rights Law Center et al. v. Cardona (Aug. 24, 2021), https:
//www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/202108-titleix-VRLC.pdf (indicating that
colleges are free to admit and consider statements by persons who have not submitted
to cross-examination). The agency’s response suggests that it will propose new
regulations that do not include this ban, but it is not clear what approach the proposed
new regulations may take regarding hearsay. It also remains to be seen whether courts
outside of Massachusetts hearing Title IX litigation will uphold the ban.
15 See infra Section II.C.3.
16 See infra Section III.B.
17 Preambles to regulations are not binding law. However, the agency writes them
pursuant to APA requirements that the regulatory process include a concise general
statement of regulations’ basis and purpose, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), and they are published in
the Federal Register. Hence, some commentators suggest they may be the most
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pages,18 and subsequent non-binding guidance documents from the
enforcing agency.19 This analysis identifies relevant guidance from the
agency, explores unsettled issues, makes suggestions for school
practices, and compares the new Title IX approach with the approach in
these legal contexts.20
As a candidate, President Biden criticized the new regulations as an
attempt to “shame and silence survivors” and promised “a quick end” to
them.21 President Biden issued an Executive Order directing their
review,22 and the agency announced its intent to publish proposed
revised regulations in May 2022.23 Any end will almost certainly not be
quick. The same years-long notice-and-comment process used to enact
regulations is required to repeal or revise them.24 And one cannot
predict or know whether the new regulations will be wholly reworked
or amended in more modest ways. In the context of the announced
intent to amend, Part III of this Article evaluates the evidentiary
approach under the current regulations using the lens of the agency’s
goals for its new process: due process and fairness for respondents,
equal treatment of complainants and respondents, the importance of
authoritative source of agency intent, analogous to legislative history for a statute. See,
e.g., Kevin Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252, 1272–77 (2016).
18 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,026–572.
19 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Questions and Answers Regarding the Department’s
Final Title IX Rule, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Sept. 4, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Q & A], https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-titleix-20200904.pdf; OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, Part I: Questions and Answers Regarding the Department’s Title IX Regulations,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter 2021 Q & A Part I], https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-titleix-part1-20210115.pdf; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Part
II: Questions and Answers Regarding the Department’s Title IX Regulations, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ. (Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter 2021 Q & A Part II], https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-titleix-part2-20210115.pdf; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Questions
and Answers on the Title IX Regulations on Sexual Harassment (July 21, 2021)
[hereinafter 2021 Q & A Part III], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/202107-qa-titleix.pdf. There are also OCR blogs on some other general issues. See
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS BLOG, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/blog
/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
20 This overview and analysis may serve as a resource for persons who become
involved in the new Title IX formal complaint process as Title IX Coordinators and
investigators, hearing decision-makers, parties, and party advisors.
21 Bianca Quilantan, Biden Vows ‘Quick End’ to DeVos’ Sexual Misconduct Rule,
POLITICO (May 6, 2020, 9:33 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/06/bidenvows-a-quick-end-to-devos-sexual-misconduct-rule-241715.
22 Exec. Order No. 14,021, 86 Fed. Reg. 13,803, 13,803 (Mar. 11, 2021).
23 OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
(2021), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=
1870-AA16 (stating intent to propose amended regulations implementing Title IX in
May 2022).
24 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(5), 553.
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credibility assessment, and the reality that schools are not courtrooms,
and decision-makers in hearings are neither trained judges nor
attorneys.
Part III explains that the new regulations fail to fulfill the agency’s
own goals for them. The complete ban on uncross-examined statements
is not a due process requirement. It fetishizes cross-examination to
assess credibility, ignoring other common and important impeachment
techniques, and fails to address the admissibility of uncross-examined
statements to impeach. Its adoption is one of a series of choices by the
agency to borrow general evidentiary approaches from the rules for
trial and modify them in ways that disfavor complainants and provide
protection for respondents that equal or exceed the trial protections for
criminal defendants. As another example, the new regulations create a
rape shield to protect complainant sexual history and character
modeled on the approach for criminal trials. The new Title IX rape
shield narrows the protections of the trial approach by eliminating
protection for the sexual history of pattern witnesses (other victims of
sexual misconduct by the respondent) and even requires the school to
disclose the complainant’s protected sexual history information to the
respondent prior to the hearing.25 The new system is purportedly
justified by the nature of school hearings and the limited expertise of
non-attorney decision-makers. The reality is that: (1) the new system
actually assumes Title IX hearing decision-makers will have great
expertise, even to the point of providing live reasoning for any rulings
to exclude evidence, which is not required of trial judges; and (2) there
exist appropriate and fairer alternatives to the ban on uncrossexamined statements and the specifics of the rape shield. For example,
school and administrative hearings normally focus on weight rather
than admissibility, admitting almost all evidence, while allowing the
parties to argue that the hearsay status or similar issues about a specific
piece of evidence demands that the decision-maker give it little or no
weight.26 The new regulations’ evidentiary approach must be wholly
reconsidered. It does not offer fairness to the parties and complainants
should consider whether filing formal complaints or otherwise
participating really serves their interests.27

25
26
27

See infra Section II.C.2.iii.
See infra Sections III.B, III.D.
See infra Section III.F.
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS FOR TITLE IX FORMAL
COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
A. Pre-Hearing: Gathering and Sharing Evidence
1. Gathering Evidence
Schools must investigate formal Title IX complaints of sexual
misconduct and are responsible for gathering evidence.28 The Preamble
recognizes that schools do not have subpoena powers to obtain
evidence.29 Moreover, the new regulations create a right to abstain from
participation in investigations and hearings,30 so schools apparently
cannot enforce personnel or student rules that require participation by
their employees or students. At the beginning of an investigation,
schools must give the parties notice of the allegations with sufficient
detail and advance notice to prepare for a voluntary initial interview.31
The parties are also free to seek and offer their own evidence, and
schools cannot limit them in doing so.32
The parties can agree to an informal resolution at any point.33
Otherwise, colleges can either dismiss formal complaints for a variety of
reasons34 or conduct a private live evidentiary hearing with a different
decision-maker than the investigator.35 K-12 schools may either
provide hearings or less formal meetings.36

34 C.F.R. §§ 106.44(b), 106.45(b)(3).
See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,051, 30,292, 30,306.
30 34 C.F.R. § 106.71.
31 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(2)(i)(B).
32 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.45(b)(5)(ii)–(iii).
33 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(9). Details of the optional informal resolution process are
beyond the scope of this Article.
34 Complaints that assert sexual misconduct not covered by the new Title IX
regulations, such as misconduct occurring outside of the U.S., or much sexual
misconduct that occurred off-campus, must be dismissed but can be processed under
school conduct codes. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(i). Schools may dismiss complaints
against students or employees who are no longer enrolled or employed, respectively.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(ii). Formal complaints may not be made after the student is no
longer enrolled at the school. 34 C.F.R. § 106.30 (definition of formal complaint). The
parties must get written notice of any dismissal, 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(iii), and may
appeal it. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(8).
35 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (live hearing requirement); 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(7)
(decision-maker cannot be investigator).
36 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii). This Article examines evidence in college hearings.
28
29
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2. Scope of Evidence Gathered in the School Investigation
As evidence for the hearing or other resolution process, school
investigators likely would attempt to interview the complainant,
respondent, and any witnesses—including any pattern witnesses who
experienced sexual misconduct by the respondent. Investigators likely
would also attempt to obtain campus security and school records, police
reports, the parties’ social media, relevant video or other recordings,
and other evidence.37 Schools may want to put a sort of litigation hold
on the parties’ school records, both to preserve evidence for the
investigation and hearing, and to avoid spoliation claims in the event of
later litigation. At the hearing, the parties, through their advisors, have
a right to cross-examine witnesses, including impeachment of
credibility,38 which is performed by the advisors to the parties,39 so
presumably the school will gather credibility evidence. But certain
evidence is barred from the investigation and/or the hearing:
• Party treatment records are excluded from both the school
investigation and the hearing.40
• Privileged information is also excluded from both the school
investigation and the hearing.41
• A new rape shield excludes some evidence from the hearing
but not the school investigation.42 As discussed below, to
the extent the school gathers such information in its
investigation it must be shared with the parties and their
advisors.
• Statements made by persons (both parties and witnesses)
who do not submit to full cross- examination are excluded
from the hearing.43 In most circumstances, this bar would
not seem to affect the evidence gathered and shared with
parties and advisors. In fact, it may not be clear until midhearing whether a witness will appear and submit to full
cross-examination.

37 A companion article provides more detail about the extensive and intimate
information schools may seek in Title IX investigations. Lynn M. Daggett, Student Privacy
in the New Title IX Sexual Misconduct Formal Complaint Process, 50 J. L. & EDUC. 64, 74–
77 (2021).
38 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
39 Id.
40 See infra Section II.C.2.i.
41 See infra Section II.C.2.ii.
42 See infra Section II.C.2.iii.
43 See infra Section II.C.3.
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3. Sharing Evidence with Parties and Advisors
Parties and their advisors must receive all the evidence the school
gathers in its investigation that is “directly related to the allegations” in
the complaint, whether or not the investigator thinks that a party will
rely on it in the hearing, and not limited to evidence the investigator
thinks is relevant.44 The parties must have at least ten days to respond
to this evidence.45 Comments on the new regulations during their
proposed stage note this provides the parties with an opportunity to
strategically add prejudicial information.46
While the new regulations themselves do not address this, the
Preamble indicates that schools may require parties and advisors to sign
non-disclosure agreements about the evidence.47 The Preamble also
indicates the investigator may redact information, including FERPAprotected personally identifiable information,48 that is not “directly
related to the allegations,” and barred information, such as privileged
information.49 At this stage, the investigator cannot redact evidence
seemingly made irrelevant and inadmissible in the hearing by the new
regulations’ rape shield.50 The Preamble indicates that unlawfully

44 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vi). In contrast, the Clery Act requires access to the
information that will actually be used in the hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(k)(3)(i)(B)(3).
45 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vii).
46 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,302 (“Commenters stated that the final regulations
would allow the improper, and potentially widespread, sharing of confidential
information and incentivize respondents to ‘slip in’ prejudicial information to
undermine the process.”).
47 Id. at 30,304 (“Recipients may require parties and advisors to refrain from
disseminating the evidence (for instance, by requiring parties and advisors to sign a
non-disclosure agreement that permits review and use of the evidence only for purposes
of the Title IX grievance process), thus providing recipients with discretion as to how to
provide evidence to the parties that directly relates to the allegations raised in the
formal complaint.”).
48 Id. at 30,429 (“Consistent with FERPA, these final regulations do not prohibit a
recipient from redacting personally identifiable information from education records, if
the information is not directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint. . . .
A recipient, however, should be judicious in redacting information and should not redact
more information than is necessary under the circumstances so as to fully comply with
obligations under § 106.45.”).
49 Id. at 30,304 (“With regard to the sharing of confidential information, a recipient
may permit or require the investigator to redact information that is not directly related
to the allegations (or that is otherwise barred from use under § 106.45, such as
information protected by a legally recognized privilege, or a party’s treatment records
if the party has not given written consent) contained within documents or other
evidence that are directly related to the allegations, before sending the evidence to the
parties for inspection and review.”).
50 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vi) (noting parties’ right to review “any evidence”
gathered in investigations); Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,352 (“disagreeing” that party
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obtained or unlawfully created information also need not be shared.51
As noted earlier, the parties may gather their own evidence without
limitation,52 and may ask the school to gather specific additional
evidence. Parties and advisors also have a right to access the school’s
investigation report the school then prepares, which is limited to
relevant information53 and thus excludes evidence protected by the rape
shield. They have at least another ten days to respond to this report,54
which may include recommendations, even recommended findings and
conclusions.55
Parents have the right to file formal complaints or otherwise
exercise legal rights on behalf of (minor) children.56 A new general Title
IX regulation notes that Title IX will not be construed in derogation of
parent rights,57 and recent non-binding guidance indicates that schools
may need to inform parents of possible sexual misconduct involving
their child so that they can exercise their rights.58 The agency
contemplates that if FERPA does not provide access rights to the parent
(for example, a minor college student who has thereby become the
holder of FERPA rights but is not yet a legal adult), the parent who filed
the formal complaint has the right to access the evidence and
investigative report.59 In other cases the Title IX Coordinator signs the
access to sexual history information gathered in the investigation effectively negates the
rape shield).
51 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,427 (“The Department is not persuaded that these
final regulations require a recipient to violate State law. If a recipient knows that a
recording is unlawfully created under State law, then the recipient should not share a
copy of such unlawful recording. The Department is not requiring a recipient to
disseminate any evidence that was illegally or unlawfully obtained.”).
52 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(iii) (explaining that recipients must not restrict parties’
ability “to gather and present relevant evidence”); Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,432
(“These final regulations do not allow a Title IX Coordinator to restrict a party’s ability
to provide evidence. If a Title IX Coordinator restricts a party from providing evidence,
then the Title IX Coordinator would be violating these final regulations and may even
have a conflict of interest or bias, as described in § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).”).
53 Hence, schools may redact non-relevant information. Preamble, supra note 2, at
30,304 (“Similarly, a recipient may permit or require the investigator to redact from the
investigative report information that is not relevant, which is contained in documents
or evidence that is relevant, because § 106.45(b)(5)(vii) requires the investigative
report to summarize only “relevant evidence.”). However, parties may assert at the
hearing that redacted or other evidence is in fact relevant and admissible.
54 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vii).
55 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,308; 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 4–5 (noting
that decision-maker cannot defer to any recommendations in the investigation report).
56 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(g).
57 Id.
58 2021 Q & A Part I, supra note 19, at 4–5.
59 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,453 (“However, in circumstances in which FERPA
would not accord a party the opportunity to inspect and review such evidence, these
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formal complaint.60 If a parent or the Title IX Coordinator files the
formal complaint, the Preamble suggests the student remains the
complainant and has access to the evidence and investigative report.61
Schools can consolidate formal complaints arising out of a common
incident with multiple complainants and/or respondents.62 While the
new regulations and Preamble are silent on this point, in this event it
appears that all of the parties and their advisors would have access to
evidence and investigative reports.
A companion article explores privacy issues in the Title IX formal
complaint context.63 Briefly, the Preamble asserts that to the extent the
school gathers evidence “directly related to the allegations” and
therefore must be shared with the parties,64 it is “directly related” to the
complainant and respondent.65 The agency reasons it is thus the FERPA
record of each of them, and each has a right of access.66 In fact, the
Preamble asserts the parties would have a FERPA right of access even
without the new regulations.67 Notably, under this theory FERPA’s
limits on re-disclosure of records68 shared with third parties do not
apply and the parties are free to share the evidence with others. The
new regulations explicitly prohibit gag orders on the “allegations under
investigation.”69 The Preamble suggests that the ban on gag orders does
not extend to discussions of evidence or the investigative report,70 and,
as discussed above, indicates schools may, but need not, require nonfinal regulations do so and provide a parent or guardian who has a legal right to act on
behalf of a party with the same opportunity.”).
60 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a).
61 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,453.
62 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(4).
63 See generally Daggett, supra note 37, at 64–112.
64 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vi).
65 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,423–26.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 30,432 (“Even if these final regulations did not exist, parties who are
students would have a right to inspect and review records directly related to the
allegations in a formal complaint under FERPA, 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(1)(A)–(B), and its
implementing regulations, 34 CFR 99.10 through 99.12, because these records would
directly relate to the parties in the complaint.”).
68 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B).
69 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(iii).
70 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,295–96 (“§ 106.45(b)(5)(iii) is not unlimited in
scope; by its terms, this provision stops a recipient from restricting parties’ ability to
discuss ‘the allegations under investigation.’ This provision does not, therefore, apply
to discussion of information that does not consist of ‘the allegations under investigation’
(for example, evidence related to the allegations that has been collected and exchanged
between the parties and their advisors during the investigation under §
106.45(b)(5)(vi), or the investigative report summarizing relevant evidence sent to the
parties and their advisors under § 106.45(b)(5)(vii)).”).
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disclosure agreements.71 The Preamble also suggests disclosures or
statements that are defamatory, invasive to privacy, or retaliatory (such
as witness tampering) are not permitted.72 Moreover, a new regulation
confoundingly asserts that Title IX regulations override FERPA
statutory requirements.73
B. The Hearing
According to recent non-binding guidance from the agency, schools
can establish rules for hearings, such as rules that limit evidence to what
was gathered and shared prior to the hearing, provide opportunities for
opening or closing statements, and set reasonable time limits for
hearings.74
1. The Decision-Maker
The decision-maker cannot be the investigator, nor the school’s
Title IX Coordinator.75 The decision-maker need not be an attorney, and
often will be an employee of the school. Decision-makers must be
trained on relevance and other evidentiary matters,76 and rule on
admissibility of evidence.77 Recent non-binding guidance from the
agency suggests that the Title IX Coordinator can play a limited role in

71 See id. at 30,304 (“Recipients may require parties and advisors to refrain from
disseminating the evidence (for instance, by requiring parties and advisors to sign a
non-disclosure agreement that permits review and use of the evidence only for purposes
of the Title IX grievance process . . . .”)). Any requirement of non-disclosure agreements
would need to apply to both parties. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b) (“Any provisions, rules, or
practices other than those required by this section that a recipient adopts as part of its
grievance process for handling formal complaints of sexual harassment as defined in §
106.30, must apply equally to both parties.”). Where advisors or parties are school
employees, FERPA bars re-disclosure. See also Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,422–23
(“The Department does not interpret Title IX as either requiring recipients to, or
prohibiting recipients from, using a non-disclosure agreement, as long as such nondisclosure agreement does not restrict the ability of either party to discuss the
allegations under investigation or to gather and present relevant evidence under §
106.45(b)(5)(iii). Any non-disclosure agreement, however, must comply with all
applicable laws.”).
72 Id. at 30,296 (clarifying that there is no right to discuss “allegations in a manner
that exposes the party to liability for defamation or related privacy torts, or in a manner
that constitutes unlawful retaliation”); id. at 30,281 (witness tampering); id. at 30,438.
73 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(e) (“The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or
alleviated by the FERPA statute, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, or FERPA regulations, 34 CFR part
99.”).
74 2021 Q & A Part III, supra note 19, at 17.
75 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(7).
76 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).
77 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6).
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the hearing to maintain order and facilitate procedurally, but
evidentiary issues must be reserved to the decision-maker.78
2. The Parties
Unlike some agencies that investigate administrative complaints
and then prosecute cases for complainants,79 or schools that present
disciplinary cases against students,80 the school does not advocate for
the complainant in a Title IX hearing. As discussed above, the parties
are normally the complainant and respondent, even if the Title IX
Coordinator signed the formal complaint. Whether or not a complainant
filed a formal complaint, however, they (and respondents) are not
required to participate in the hearing and cannot suffer retaliation for
this decision.81 Where the parent filed or responded to a complaint on
behalf of a minor, it appears the parent is the party.
3. Party Advisors
The parties have the right to use an attorney or lay advisor of their
choosing,82 and the school must provide a free advisor to parties who
have not chosen a private advisor.83 The Preamble suggests that
advisors need not be impartial, and schools are not required to train
advisors.84 The Preamble also indicates that schools must appoint
advisors for absent parties.85

78 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 2 (“The Title IX regulations do not preclude a
Title IX Coordinator from serving as a hearing officer whose function is to control the
order and decorum of the hearing, so long as that role as a hearing officer is distinct from
the ‘decision-maker’ whose role is to, among other obligations, objectively evaluate all
relevant evidence, apply the standard of evidence to reach a determination regarding
responsibility, issue the written determination, and (during any live hearing with crossexamination) determine whether a question is relevant (and explain any decision to
exclude a question as not relevant) before a party or witness answers a question.”).
79 See, e.g., NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., The NLRB Process, https://web.archive.org/web/
20210426045926/https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process (investigating prior
to prosecuting unfair labor practice complaints).
80 See generally JAMES RAPP, 3 EDUCATION LAW § 9.09 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 2020).
81 34 C.F.R. § 106.71(a) (Retaliation prohibited against a person who “refused to
participate in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this part.”).
82 Schools may require a new advisor if an advisor does not comply with rules of
decorum in a hearing. 2021 Q & A Part III, supra note 19, at 17.
83 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(iv) (party’s right to retain advisor of party’s choosing);
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (school appointment of advisor when party has not retained
an advisor).
84 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,342.
85 See Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,346.
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4. Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof
Respondents must be presumed innocent.86 Schools cannot
impose sanctions on respondents who have not yet been found
responsible; recent non-binding guidance from the agency suggests that
even a temporary hold on graduation or a transcript will generally not
be permitted.87 Schools choose whether to use the preponderance of
evidence standard that normally governs administrative hearings and
civil litigation, or a higher “clear and convincing evidence” standard.88
But the burden of proof for student respondents cannot be lower than
that for faculty respondents.89 For example, if a school’s faculty
handbook, staff collective bargaining agreement, or tenure contract
requires clear and convincing evidence for employee discipline, that
must be the burden of proof for the school’s Title IX student hearings.

86 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iv) (Grievance process must “[i]nclude a presumption
that the respondent is not responsible for the alleged conduct until a determination
regarding responsibility is made at the conclusion of the grievance process.”). No
disciplinary or punitive consequences may be imposed on respondents prior to a
determination of responsibility. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(vi). Schools can do interim
emergency removal of respondents, but only when there is an “immediate threat to the
physical health or safety of any student or other individual.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(c).
87 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 9–10 (“The Title IX regulations prohibit a
recipient from imposing ‘any disciplinary sanctions or other actions that are not
supportive measures as defined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.30, against a respondent’ without
following the 34 C.F.R. § 106.45 grievance process. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.44(a),
106.45(b)(1)(i). Even a temporary ‘hold’ on a transcript, registration, or graduation will
generally be considered to be disciplinary, punitive, and/or unreasonably burdensome,
and appropriate supportive measures cannot be disciplinary, punitive, or unreasonably
burdensome. In the Preamble to the regulations at, e.g., 30,182, the Department stated:
‘[r]emoval from sports teams (and similar exclusions from school-related activities) also
require a fact-specific analysis, but whether the burden is “unreasonable” does not
depend on whether the respondent still has access to academic programs; whether a
supportive measure meets the § 106.30(a) definition also includes analyzing whether a
respondent’s access to the array of educational opportunities and benefits offered by
the recipient is unreasonably burdened. Changing a class schedule, for example, may
more often be deemed an acceptable, reasonable burden than restricting a respondent
from participating on a sports team, holding a student government position,
participating in an extracurricular activity, and so forth.’”).
88 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(vii).
89 Id.
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5. Witnesses and Cross-Examination
The investigator may be a witness.90 The decision-maker will have
the investigation report and any party responses,91 but the report is not
evidence.92
There is a right to full and live cross-examination of anyone who
makes a statement, including persons who made statements outside of
the hearing.93 Witnesses may appear remotely for cross-examination,94
which advisors perform and not the parties.95 However, the Preamble
indicates that direct examination is not limited to advisors.96 The
Preamble indicates that schools have discretion as to who conducts
direct examination.97 Schools may want to enact rules providing that
only advisors may conduct direct examination, to prevent parties from
calling hostile witnesses in order to conduct direct examination
themselves.
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,314; 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 4 (noting,
however, that the investigator cannot testify to statements by persons who do not
submit to cross-examination).
91 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,309; 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 6–7 (“The
Title IX regulations . . . do not prescribe how or when the investigative report should be
given to the decision-maker. Because the purpose of this requirement, found at 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.45(b)(5)(vii), is to ensure that the parties are prepared for a hearing or, if no
hearing is required or otherwise provided, that the parties have the opportunity to have
their views of the evidence considered by the decision-maker, the decision-maker will
need to have the investigative report and the parties’ responses to same, prior to
reaching a determination regarding responsibility, but the timing and manner of
transmitting the investigative report to the decision-maker is within the recipient’s
discretion.”).
92 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 8 (“The Title IX regulations do not deem the
investigative report itself, or a party’s written response to it, as relevant evidence that a
decision-maker must consider, and the decision-maker has an independent obligation
to evaluate the relevance of available evidence, including evidence summarized in the
investigative report, and to consider all other relevant evidence. The decision-maker
may not, however, consider evidence that the regulations preclude the decision-maker
from considering. (For instance, the regulations preclude a recipient from using in a
Title IX grievance process information protected by a legally recognized privilege, a
party’s treatment records, or (as to postsecondary institutions) a party or witness’s
statements, unless the party or witness has submitted to cross-examination. 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.45(b)(1)(x), 106.45(b)(5), 106.45(b)(6)(i).)”).
93 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i). The agency suggests that school policy could limit the
role of advisors and thereby enhance party participation and autonomy in a variety of
ways: providing that advisors do not represent parties, providing that parties may
prevent advisors from asking their own questions and limit advisors to asking questions
provided by the party, or providing that advisors may not make objections or
arguments, leaving those matters for the parties. 2021 Q & A Part III, supra note 19, at
34.
94 Id. (providing for the possibility of remote testimony and cross-examination).
95 Id.
96 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,342.
97 Id.
90
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6. Decision
The decision-maker must issue a detailed written decision that the
school must share with the parties.98 FERPA permits colleges to publicly
disclose the names of students found to commit certain violent or sex
offenses.99 The new Title IX regulations generally forbid disclosure of
respondents’ names but allow release when permitted by FERPA.100
Recent nonbinding guidance from the agency indicates that names of
respondents found responsible cannot be publicly disclosed for
retaliatory reasons.101
C. Admissibility of Evidence at the Hearing
The parties may not be limited in presenting evidence, including
expert witnesses.102 The Preamble indicates that schools may enact
rules of decorum to “forbid badgering a witness” or to “prohibit any
party advisor or decision-maker from questioning witnesses in an
abusive, intimidating, or disrespectful manner.”103 Schools should
consider adopting rules of this type. The Preamble, however, forbids

34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(7).
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B), (C) (“(B) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing the final results of
any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against a student who is an
alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 of title
18), or a nonforcible sex offense, if the institution determines as a result of that
disciplinary proceeding that the student committed a violation of the institution’s rules
or policies with respect to such crime or offense.
(C) For the purpose of this paragraph, the final results of any disciplinary proceeding:
(i) shall include only the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction
imposed by the institution on that student; and
(ii) may include the name of any other student, such as a victim or witness, only with the
written consent of that other student.”).
100 34 C.F.R. § 106.71(a).
101 2021 Q & A Part I, supra note 19, at 7.
102 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(iii) (Recipients must not restrict parties’ ability “to
gather and present evidence.”); Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,432 (“These final
regulations do not allow a Title IX Coordinator to restrict a party’s ability to provide
evidence. If a Title IX Coordinator restricts a party from providing evidence, then the
Title IX Coordinator would be violating these final regulations and may even have a
conflict of interest or bias, as described in § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).”); 34 C.F.R. §
106.45(b)(5)(ii) (Schools must “[p]rovide an equal opportunity for the parties to
present witnesses, including fact and expert witnesses, and other inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.”).
103 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,248, 30,319.
98
99
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schools from adopting rules of evidence.104 Admitted evidence must be
objectively evaluated.105
The new regulations leave many gaps and open issues concerning
admissible evidence in Title IX hearings. As noted above, the nonbinding Preamble purports to resolve some issues at least partially.
Further complicating matters, schools are forbidden from adopting
their own rules for admission of evidence in Title IX hearings,106
whether to address these gaps and omissions or for other reasons. But
the Preamble indicates that schools may adopt rules about the weight
given to certain categories of evidence.107
The parties may raise alleged evidence errors in internal school
appeals, external Title IX complaints, and Title IX and other litigation.108
1. Relevance
i. Live Rulings and On-the-Record Reasoning
Whether or not a dispute or objection exists, the decision-maker
must determine the relevance of each question before it is answered and
offer reasoning for any determination that a question lacks relevance.109
This contrasts with the approach for trials where judges need not offer
live or post hoc reasoning for their evidentiary rulings.110 Schools must
provide training to decision-makers on relevance.111 It is unclear what
the appeal standard will be for on-the-record decision-maker reasoning
in Title IX hearings. Courts find no error if the trial judge comes to the
right result, even if they used faulty extant supporting reasoning.112 The
same approach seems appropriate here, with the caveat that some
decision-maker reasoning may constitute actionable evidence of bias.
The requirement for contemporaneous reasoning when a question is
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,336–37.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(ii) (requiring “an objective evaluation of all relevant
evidence—including both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence” not related to
complainant or other status).
106 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,294.
107 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,248, 30,294.
108 See infra Section II.D.
109 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“Before a complainant, respondent, or witness
answers a cross-examination or other question, the decision-maker(s) must first
determine whether the question is relevant and explain any decision to exclude a
question as not relevant.”). The agency suggests this will slow down the pace of crossexamination and thereby lessen pressure on the witness. 2021 Q & A Part III, supra note
19, at 19.
110 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 103(c) (“The court may make any statement” about rulings)
(emphasis added).
111 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).
112 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (error must affect a substantial right of the parties).
104
105
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excluded as irrelevant would seem to incentivize decision-makers to
find questions relevant. A finding of relevance avoids the requirement
of putting reasoning on the record and may also avoid claims of bias
against the decision-maker.
ii. Relevance Generally
The new regulations exclude certain evidence as irrelevant,113 but
do not define relevance generally. Presumably, since the decisionmaker will often be a school official who is not an attorney, the term is
not used in a hyper-technical sense. On its face, Title IX relevance might
reasonably be interpreted to refer to “logical” relevance114 as in Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 401 (the evidence adds something to a fact at
issue in the hearing, such as: whether and what sexual misconduct
happened; witness credibility; the impact of any misconduct on the
complainant, such as mental trauma, physical injury, or academic
difficulty; and what sanctions or remedies might be appropriate).
Alternatively, Title IX relevance might reasonably be interpreted as
“practical” relevance115 as in Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403 (what
the evidence adds to the case is not greatly outweighed by unfair
prejudice, unnecessary delay, or confusing or misleading the factfinder).
As noted above, however, the Preamble indicates schools may not
adopt their own rules of evidence and specifically forbids adoption of a
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403-type practical relevance standard:
“a recipient may not adopt a rule excluding relevant evidence because
such relevant evidence may be unduly prejudicial, concern prior bad
acts, or constitute character evidence.”116 The Preamble does indicate
that decision-makers “may fairly deem repetition of the same question
to be irrelevant,”117 suggesting some support for the concept of marginal
relevance (i.e., looking at what a piece of evidence adds over and above
the other admitted evidence), but does not endorse a marginal
relevance approach more generally. The Preamble reasons that
decision-makers in Title IX hearings are generally not attorneys and
thus are unfamiliar with evidence rules for trials.118 The agency’s
guidance is consistent with understanding the decision-maker to be a
trained person more akin to a judge in a bench trial—who can
appropriately weight evidence with low-level practical relevance—than

113
114
115
116
117
118

See infra Section II.C.1.
FED. R. EVID. 401.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,248; see also id. at 30,294.
Id. at 30,248.
See id. at 30,347.
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to a lay juror. Hence, perhaps practical relevance concerns need not
weigh heavily at the admissibility level in Title IX hearings. As discussed
above, however, the combination of requiring on-the-record reasoning
when a question is excluded and rejecting a practical relevance standard
for admissibility likely means that decision-makers cannot and do not
often find evidence irrelevant. This reluctance may result in lengthy and
inefficient hearings.
The Preamble also indicates that schools cannot enact rules that
make categories of evidence inadmissible, offering examples of lie
detector test results and rape kits.119 The Preamble suggests, however,
that the
grievance process does not prescribe rules governing how
admissible, relevant evidence must be evaluated for weight or
credibility by a recipient’s decision-maker, and recipients thus
have discretion to adopt and apply rules in that regard, so long
as such rules do not conflict with [the regulation] and apply
equally to both parties.120
Perhaps, for example, a school could adopt a rule that notes the
unreliability of lie detector test results and their subsequent
inadmissibility in trials,121 and provides that such results should
therefore be given little weight in Title IX hearings.
2. Barred Evidence—Party Treatment Records, Privileged
Information, Rape Shield
i. Party Treatment Records
Schools may not access or use a party’s medical or psychological
treatment records without voluntary written consent.122 The Preamble

Id. at 30,294.
Id.
121 See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
7:21 (4th ed. 2009 & May 2020 update) (noting unreliability of lie detector tests,
resulting in the inadmissibility of their results).
122 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5) (“When investigating a formal complaint and throughout
the grievance process, a recipient must[:] (i) Ensure that the burden of proof and the
burden of gathering evidence sufficient to reach a determination regarding
responsibility rest on the recipient and not on the parties provided that the recipient
cannot access, consider, disclose, or otherwise use a party’s records that are made or
maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized professional
or paraprofessional acting in the professional’s or paraprofessional’s capacity, or
assisting in that capacity, and which are made and maintained in connection with the
provision of treatment to the party, unless the recipient obtains that party’s voluntary,
written consent to do so for a grievance process under this section (if a party is not an
‘eligible student,’ . . . then the recipient must obtain the voluntary, written consent of a
119
120
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suggests this provision covers records of all treatment—by private offcampus providers, by on-campus providers in school health clinics, and
by on-campus providers outside of a school health clinic, such as a nurse
or counselor employed by a K-12 school.123 The provision, however, is
explicitly limited to the treatment records of parties. Schools are not
banned from non-consensual access to treatment records of nonparties—such as treatment records of pattern witnesses, other
witnesses such as friends of the parties—as perhaps bearing on the
credibility of the parties,124 or to establish a pattern of sexual
misconduct by the respondent. As discussed above, the school shares
the evidence gathered with the parties and advisors. Thus, when a party
consents to release of treatment records, normally both parties and
their advisors will have full access to those records.125
Since schools are forbidden from non-consensually accessing party
treatment records, it seems that such records will not commonly be
offered in the hearing. But it is possible treatment records will be
available because the opposing party independently accessed them, or
a party consented to disclosure, or a school investigation erroneously
included them. Portions of available party treatment records may
nonetheless be irrelevant because the party did not provide consent,
because they are protected by a privilege,126 such as those for therapists
and physicians (or in the case of pastoral counseling, for clergy) that has
not been waived, or because they are protected by the rape shield.127 In
the case of privilege, whether a privilege exists and whether it was
waived may need to be decided.
Moreover, to the extent a party treatment record contains
statements of another person, those statements must be excluded

‘parent’ . . .)”). Thus for minor students not yet in college, the parent consents rather
than the student.
123 The Preamble suggests schools must comply with state and federal laws
concerning treatment records. Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,434 (“Medical records may
be subject to other Federal and State laws that govern recipients, and recipients should
comply with those laws.”). However, the regulations themselves state that “[t]o the
extent of a conflict between State or local law and Title IX as implemented by §§ 106.30,
106.44, and 106.45, the obligation to comply with §§ 106.30, 106.44, and 106.45 is not
obviated or alleviated by any State or local law.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(h).
124 The new regulations require an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
including attacking credibility. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“At the live hearing, the
decision-maker(s) must permit each party’s advisor to ask the other party and any
witnesses all relevant questions and follow-up questions, including those challenging
credibility.”).
125 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,434.
126 See infra Section II.C.2.ii.
127 See infra Section II.C.2.iii.
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unless that other person submits to live cross-examination.128 For
example, if a complainant went to therapy and the therapist diagnosed
PTSD, or a complainant went for a physical exam and the doctor noted
bruising and other injuries, those statements need to be redacted from
medical records unless the therapist or doctor, respectively, submitted
to full cross-examination at the hearing.
ii. Privileged Information
Use of privileged information is also forbidden unless waived.129
The regulation does not set out a list of applicable privileges or address
whether state or federal privilege rules apply. The Preamble mentions
attorney-client, spousal, and doctor-patient privileges.130 Notably, there
is a federal therapist privilege but not a federal doctor-patient
privilege.131 The Preamble also notes that respondents may assert their
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in which case the
Preamble indicates the respondent’s statements would be inadmissible
and no inference from failure to testify could be drawn.132 The new
regulations include this bar on inferences from failure to testify,133
which is the approach in criminal but not civil trials.134 Where the
contours of the relevant federal and state privilege differ (perhaps, for
example, about which “therapist” credentials qualify for the
privilege),135 the regulations provide no guidance on which privilege
See infra Section II.C.3.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(x) (Schools may “[n]ot require, allow, rely upon, or
otherwise use questions or evidence that constitute, or seek disclosure of, information
protected under a legally recognized privilege, unless the person holding such privilege
has waived the privilege.”).
130 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,277.
131 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§ 5:42, 5:43.
132 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,352 (“As discussed above, we have revised §
106.45(b)(6)(i) to direct a decision-maker who must not rely on the statement of a party
who has not appeared or submitted to cross-examination not to draw any inference
about the determination regarding responsibility based on the party’s absence or
refusal to be cross-examined (or refusal to answer other questions, such as those posed
by the decision-maker). This modification provides protection to respondents
exercising Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination (though it applies equally
to protect complainants who choose not to appear or testify).”).
133 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“[T]he decision-maker(s) cannot draw an inference
about the determination regarding responsibility based solely on a party’s or witness’s
absence from the live hearing or refusal to answer cross-examination or other
questions.”).
134 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (holding that invocation of Fifth
Amendment privilege is subject to comment, and an adverse inference may be drawn in
civil lawsuits); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (determining no comment
permitted about criminal defendant’s decision not to testify).
135 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (exploring this issue, and finding
federal therapist privilege includes licensed social workers).
128
129
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applies. Since the regulation refers to “a legally recognized privilege,”136
the best approach seems to be to protect information covered by either
a federal privilege (since these hearings are conducted pursuant to
federal statute) or a privilege of the applicable state (which may include
additional privileges, such as physicians-patients and journalistsconfidential sources). Moreover, and as with the approach for
relevance, since the decision-maker is often not an attorney, a hypertechnical approach does not seem realistic or appropriate. The
privileges most likely at issue regarding evidence at these hearings
seem to be attorney-client and related work product privileges,
therapist137 and physician138 privileges, and the constitutional Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Occasionally, a party
may claim the clergy privilege, the journalist privilege, or one of the two
spousal privileges (spousal testimonial privilege and marital
communications privilege). State law may include other privileges, such
as a privilege for communications with sexual assault support staff or
lay advocates.139
Some privileges listed above apply to “confidential”
“communications.”140 As to confidentiality, conversations in public or
under other circumstances where it is reasonably foreseeable that third
persons may hear information likely are not privileged. In a recent Title
IX case, a federal court found that attorney-client privilege had been
waived for several student plaintiffs’ emails to their attorney.141
Analogizing from case law concerning employee emails, the court held
that using the school email system, which had “terms and conditions”
available to (although perhaps not read by) students stating that there
was no privacy in school emails, amounted to a waiver of any
privilege.142
External law also limits reasonable expectations of privacy and
“confidentiality.” Courts have held that the parameters of “confidential”
medical information in disclosure claims are determined by looking to
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(x).
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (recognizing a federal therapist-patient privilege, in part
because “[e]ffective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and
trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts,
emotions, memories, and fears.”).
138 In federal court there is no doctor-patient privilege to protect communications for
physical health treatment, but many states recognize such a privilege for trials in their
courts. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 5:42.
139 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 5:43.
140 See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§ 5:17, 5:18 (examining
confidentiality and communications elements for attorney-client privilege).
141 Doe 1 v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 480 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229–30 (D.D.C. 2020).
142 Id. at 227–28.
136
137
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an external legal source.143 For example, school health clinic records are
subject to FERPA and not the HIPAA Privacy Rule. FERPA does not itself
create a privilege, so disclosure of school health clinic records within the
school to the extent permitted by FERPA may be outside of therapist and
physician privileges.144
State law, however, may add further
confidentiality requirements to these records.145
Also,
“communications” do not include observations. For example, a
witness’s testimony that a party had (or did not have) defensive wounds
or other injuries to their person is an observation, not a communication,
and hence may be outside an otherwise applicable privilege.
As the provision states, privileges may be waived.146 Waiver can
occur through: (1) intentional sharing of information (even if it is not
understood that the sharing waives the privilege), such as deliberate
sharing of otherwise privileged treatment records; (2) inadvertent
disclosure (for example, during formal discovery prior to litigation,
accidentally sharing privileged information with the other party); and
(3) implied waiver (for example, suing for medical and mental harm
damages sustained in a car accident likely waives privilege as to
relevant medical and therapy records, respectively). Generally, the
scope of the waiver is not a blanket one, but instead is limited either to
only what was actually disclosed, or in the case of implied waiver, to
information relevant to the matter at hand.147 In Title IX hearings, the
complainant does not seek damages from the respondent, so filing the
complaint likely does not amount to an implied waiver. But an implied
waiver may occur when a witness uses privileged notes to refresh
memory or otherwise assist with hearing testimony.148 In the event of
waiver, the decision-maker will also need to determine its scope.

Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985).
See Doe v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 16-CV-28, 2016 WL 6237510, at *1–2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 24,
2016) (imposing sanctions for refusing to answer deposition questions on grounds of
FERPA protection because FERPA does not create a privilege). See generally Lynn M.
Daggett, Female Student Patient “Privacy” at Campus Health Clinics: Realities and
Consequences, 50 U. BALT. L. REV. 79 (2020) (exploring privacy in school health clinic
records).
145 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.02.005–905 (2020) (adopting Uniform Health Care
Information Act, which creates confidentiality with no exclusion of student records).
146 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 (setting out types of waivers and their respective scope
for attorney-client and work product privileges).
147 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Mo. 2006).
148 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 6:97.
143
144
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iii. Rape Shield
The new Title IX regulations create a rape shield149 for
complainants modeled on the approach to criminal trials under the
federal evidence rule.150 This provision renders most evidence of the
complainant’s sexual history and sexual character/disposition
irrelevant and thus inadmissible in the hearing. The rape shield does
not apply to the voluntary informal resolution process, although
presumably the parties could agree that it applies.151 According to the
Preamble, the Title IX rape shield does not bar schools from gathering
protected information in the school’s investigation, which is shared with
the parties and their advisors.152 Thus, a respondent may know about
and try to admit such evidence in the hearing.
Title IX’s rape shield153 includes two exceptions, both modeled on
the federal evidentiary rape shield for criminal154 trials: (1) evidence
“offered to prove that someone other than the respondent committed
the conduct alleged by the complainant”155 (for example, sexual activity
149 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (Regarding grievance hearings in higher education:
“Questions and evidence about the complainant’s sexual predisposition or prior sexual
behavior are not relevant, unless such questions and evidence about the complainant’s
prior sexual behavior are offered to prove that someone other than the respondent
committed the conduct alleged by the complainant, or if the questions and evidence
concern specific incidents of the complainant’s prior sexual behavior with respect to the
respondent and are offered to prove consent.”); id. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii) (grievance
adjudication procedures in K-12 schools).
150 See FED. R. EVID. 412 (creating an exception for constitutionally required evidence,
such as prior false allegations of sexual assault by the victim, or a motive to label
consensual sexual contact with the defendant as rape (for example, to preserve the
victim’s marriage or other relationship)).
151 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(9).
152 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,352 (“The Department disagrees that the evidence
exchange provision in § 106.45(b)(5)(vi) negates the rape shield protections in
§106.45(b)(6)(i)–(ii). As noted by the Supreme Court, rape shield protections generally
are designed to protect complainants from harassing, irrelevant inquiries into sexual
behavior at trial.”).
153 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (Regarding grievance hearings in higher education:
“Questions and evidence about the complainant’s sexual predisposition or prior sexual
behavior are not relevant, unless such questions and evidence about the complainant’s
prior sexual behavior are offered to prove that someone other than the respondent
committed the conduct alleged by the complainant, or if the questions and evidence
concern specific incidents of the complainant’s prior sexual behavior with respect to the
respondent and are offered to prove consent.”); id. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii) (grievance
adjudication procedures in K-12 schools).
154 The rape shield approach in civil trials was not adopted. See FED. R. EVID.
412(b)(2) (“In a civil case, the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs
the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. The court may
admit evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the victim has placed it in controversy.”).
155 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i), (ii).
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with someone other than the respondent close to the time of the alleged
sexual assault by the respondent to explain the complainant’s injuries
or physical evidence), and (2) “evidence concern[ing] specific incidents
of the complainant’s prior sexual behavior with respect to the
respondent . . . to prove consent”156 (prior consensual activity between
the parties as evidence that the complained of conduct was consensual).
The federal rape shield evidence rule for criminal trials also contains an
exception for evidence that is constitutionally required,157 for example,
prior false allegations of sexual assault by the victim, or a motive to label
consensual sexual contact with the defendant as rape (perhaps to
preserve the victim’s marriage or other relationship). The Preamble
indicates this evidence is not truly sexual history or sexual
predisposition evidence, implying it is outside the rape shield and would
thus not be barred by it.158
There is no indication in the new regulations or Preamble that the
rape shield can be waived. Thus, the rape shield arguably bars
admission of parts of some treatment records. For example, even if a
student complainant shared details of sexual history in counseling and
consented to school access of those records, which were then shared
with the respondent, the records may not be relevant and admissible in
the hearing.
The Title IX rape shield is explicitly limited to complainants. It thus
does not bar evidence of the respondent’s sexual history and character,
including the respondent’s sexual assault or harassment of other
persons, who may testify as pattern witnesses. This approach also
mirrors federal rules of evidence for trials, which expressly make some
prior sexual misconduct of defendants admissible in some civil and
criminal sexual misconduct trials.159 But the Title IX rape shield appears
not to apply to pattern witnesses who are not parties in the hearing; in
contrast to the federal evidence rule for trials which repeatedly refers
to evidence concerning “a victim,”160 the new Title IX regulations
reference “the complainant.”161

Id. The parameters of the consent exception may depend on the school’s
definition of consent. 2021 Q & A Part III, supra note 19, at 24–25.
157 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(c).
158 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,351.
159 FED. R. EVID. 413–415.
160 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (stating that this
rule “extends to ‘pattern’ witnesses in both criminal and civil cases whose testimony
about other instances of sexual misconduct by the person accused is otherwise
admissible”).
161 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
156
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3. Banned Evidence in Higher Education Hearings
Statements by Persons Who Do Not Submit to CrossExamination
While the Clery Act allows statements in hearings that are not
cross-examined,162 the new Title IX regulations provide that, at the
college level, statements of persons who do not submit to live crossexamination at the hearing must be excluded: “If a party or witness does
not submit to cross-examination at the live hearing, the decisionmaker(s) must not rely on any statement of that party or witness in
reaching a determination regarding responsibility.”163
One federal trial court found this complete “ban” on uncrossexamined statements to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).164 Subsequently, the DOE issued a
non-binding guidance letter indicating it will not administratively
enforce the ban,165 and so it seems that DOE will not include the ban in
its present form in the proposed revised regulations it plans to issue.
Schools may choose to revise their Title IX policies to allow some or all
cross-examined statements. Schools can do so without worry that DOE
will find this change violates Title IX in the context of Title IX OCR
complaints and compliance audits. In the context of Title IX litigation,
however, other courts may view the ban as not arbitrary and capricious
and determine that schools must continue to follow it.
This ban explicitly applies to both parties and nonparty
witnesses.166 As a result, either party can prevent their interview or
other statements from being admitted at the hearing by refusing to
submit to cross-examination. Witnesses also have this option. Neither
schools nor parties have obligations to attempt to secure attendance by

See 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(k).
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (providing also that “the decision-maker(s) cannot
draw an inference about the determination regarding responsibility based solely on a
party’s or witness’s absence from the live hearing or refusal to answer crossexamination or other questions”).
164 Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104, 2021 WL 3185743, *16 (D. Mass.
July 28, 2021). The court later clarified that it was vacating the ban generally, and not
only with regard to the parties. Order, Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104
(D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2021), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/massachusetts/madce/1:2020cv11104/222276/186/0.pdf.
165 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Dear Students, Educators, and Other
Stakeholders Letter re Victim Rights Law Center et al. v. Cardona (Aug. 24, 2021), https:/
/www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/202108-titleix-VRLC.pdf (indicating that
colleges are free to admit and consider statements by persons who have not submitted
to cross-examination).
166 Id.
162
163
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witnesses.167 Some witnesses may be unavailable to testify at the
hearing; their statements would also be excluded. As discussed above,
the new regulations provide that inferences may not be drawn from a
failure or refusal to submit to cross-examination.168 According to the
Preamble, this ban cannot be waived by agreement of the parties.169 The
Preamble suggests that witnesses are not required to answer questions
posed by the decision-maker, and a witness’s failure to answer a
question from the decision-maker would not render their statements
inadmissible.170
i. Ban Limited to Determination of Responsibility
The ban is limited to the determination of responsibility. Thus, it
does not appear to bar evidence offered regarding sanctions against
respondents found responsible,171 nor to the impact of misconduct on
the victim as relevant to determine appropriate remedies for the
complainant. Less clear is whether it applies to the impact of
misconduct on the victim to determine whether the misconduct caused
denial of equal access to the educational program.172 For example, a
complainant’s academic transcript showing a decline in grades
coinciding with misconduct seems relevant to both academic remedies
and whether misconduct caused denial of equal access to the
educational program, and as to the latter, is likely subject to the ban.
ii. “Submitting” to Cross-Examination
The Preamble indicates that a party advisor might decide not to
cross-examine a witness; only an opportunity to do so is required.173
167 Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (defining prohibited retaliation to include school
“coerc[ion]” involving Title IX rights, including refusing to participate in a Title IX
investigation or hearing).
168 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(1).
169 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349.
170 Id.
171 Recent agency guidance indicates hearings may be bifurcated for responsibility
and sanctions, perhaps with different decision-makers. 2020 Q & A, supra note 19, at
10–11.
172 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a)(1)–(3) (defining sexual harassment to require effective
denial of access to the educational program).
173 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349 (“Probing the credibility and reliability of
statements asserted by witnesses contained in such evidence requires the parties to
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses making the statements. The
Department appreciates the opportunity to clarify here that to ‘submit to crossexamination’ means answering those cross-examination questions that are relevant; the
decision-maker is required to make relevance determinations regarding crossexamination in real time during the hearing in part to ensure that parties and witnesses
do not feel compelled to answer irrelevant questions for fear of their statements being
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This suggests a possible workaround in some cases: making a record at
the hearing that a declarant is available for cross-examination, but the
opposing party indicates that they do not wish to cross-examine.
Otherwise, “submitting” is undefined. Two primary issues here include:
(1) witnesses who willingly answer questions but assert a (real or
feigned) lack of memory, and (2) witnesses who answer most questions
on cross-examination but refuse to answer one or more specific
questions. As to the latter issue, on its face, it seems appropriate for the
decision-maker to reflect on whether a witness offers an adequate basis
to evaluate demeanor and credibility and whether the opposing party
had a fair opportunity to cross-examine. However, non-binding agency
guidance suggests the witness must answer all relevant questions.174 As
to lack of memory, guidance from case law involving these issues in
trials may be helpful. For example, under federal evidence rules
governing hearsay in trials, a witness is not “unavailable” when they are
willing to answer questions, even if most of the witness’s answers report
a lack of memory, and whether or not the lack of memory appears
real.175
iii. The Approach to Hearsay of the Rules of Evidence for
Trials
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally ban hearsay,176 but also
create limits on what is actually hearsay, as well as several dozen
excluded.”) (emphasis added and omitted from original); 2020 Q & A, supra note 19, at 9
(“Thus, the decision-maker is obligated to ‘permit’ each party’s advisor to ask all
relevant questions. However, this provision provides only an ‘opportunity’ for each
party (through an advisor) to conduct cross-examination; this provision does not
purport to require that each party conduct cross-examination or will conduct crossexamination to the fullest extent possible. If a party chooses not to conduct crossexamination of another party or witness, that other party or witness cannot ‘submit’ or
‘not submit’ to cross-examination. Accordingly, the decision-maker is not precluded
from relying on any statement of the party or witness who was not given the opportunity
to submit to cross-examination. The same is true if a party’s advisor asks some crossexamination questions but not every possible cross-examination question; as to crossexamination questions not asked of a party or witness, that party or witness cannot be
said to have submitted or not submitted to cross-examination, so the decision-maker is
not precluded from relying on that party’s or witness’s statements.”).
174 2020 Q & A, supra note 19, at 9 (“Conversely, if a party or witness answers one, or
some, but not all, relevant cross-examination questions asked by a party’s advisor at the
live hearing, then that party or witness has not submitted to cross-examination and that
party’s or witness’s statements cannot be relied on by the decision-maker.”). See
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349 (“[T]he Department declines to allow a party or
witness to ‘waive’ a question because such a rule would circumvent the benefits and
purposes of cross-examination as a truth-seeking tool for postsecondary institutions’
Title IX adjudications.”).
175 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:112.
176 FED. R. EVID. 802.
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exceptions to the ban. The Federal Rules of Evidence limit hearsay to
“statements,”177 an approach that appears to have been adopted by the
new Title IX regulations, as discussed below.178 Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, evidence offered for a nontruth purpose is not hearsay,179
an issue that is unclear under the new regulations. The Federal Rules of
Evidence for trials also make the statements of opposing parties and
their agents and co-conspirators admissible nonhearsay180 on the
theory that they are important evidence, and the parties have a fair
opportunity to testify, present other evidence to put their statement in
context, explain, or deny it.181 The new Title IX regulations do not adopt
this approach. The Federal Rules of Evidence for trials create a long list
of admissible categories of hearsay, such as business records and other
generally reliable categories of statements,182 and other exceptions
when the declarant is unavailable for testimony and cross-examination,
including statements against interest.183 The new Title IX regulations
adopt no hearsay exceptions. When prosecutors offer evidence against
criminal defendants, the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause limits
admission of certain hearsay.184 The new Title IX regulations reject this
approach. Title IX’s unprecedented and complete ban on uncrossexamined statements in hearings exists despite the lack of power of
schools, parties, and advisors to subpoena witnesses for crossexamination. Moreover, even if school conduct codes or workplace
rules require cooperation by student or employee witnesses, in Title IX
formal complaint proceedings there is a right not to participate.185 In
many cases, the ban on uncross-examined statements will make it very
difficult to admit sufficient evidence for the decision-maker to find the
respondent responsible.

FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (ban on uncross-examined evidence limited to
“statements”).
179 FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
180 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
181 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:44.
182 See generally FED. R. EVID. 803.
183 See generally FED. R. EVID. 804.
184 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§ 8:26–8:34 (surveying the
Court’s past and current approach to the Confrontation Clause); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (setting forth the Court’s current Confrontation
Clause analysis).
185 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(1).
177
178
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a. Statements
The scope of the Title IX hearing ban on uncross-examined
“statements” is not certain. “Statements” under the Federal Rules of
Evidence for trials are limited to verbal or nonverbal assertions.186
Under those rules, a true question is not a statement, nor is conduct a
statement, unless the actor intends the conduct to express a message.
For example, a classmate asking a complainant “Why are you shaking
and crying?” would not be a statement by the classmate, nor would the
shaking and crying behavior be a statement by the complainant, unless
they made themself shake and cry for the purpose of expressing a
message. The Preamble suggests that “statement” should be used in its
ordinary sense and would not include behavior not intended to express
a message.187 For example, the Preamble indicates that a video
recording of actions (perhaps even of the alleged sexual misconduct)
would not normally be a statement.188 In a non-binding blog, the agency
also indicates that statements of verbal sexual harassment such as, “If
you go on a date with me, I’ll give you a higher grade in my class,” is also
not an excluded “statement” because it does not make a factual
assertion.189 The Federal Rules of Evidence for trials also limit hearsay
to assertions by human declarants. Presumably, a machine or animal
does not make a statement, and so a dog barking, or a time display on a
clock, or an automated store receipt dated at the time of the alleged
misconduct would not be barred. The new Title IX regulations and
Preamble do not explicitly address this issue, but it seems reasonable to
interpret the Preamble’s limitation of statements to assertions made by
human declarants.
The Federal Rules of Evidence for trials also exclude statements
that are offered for purposes other than truth from hearsay.190 For
example, if a witness testifies they saw the respondent harass the
complainant at a basketball game, repetition at trial of a statement by
someone who was present at the game that they saw no harassment
would be admissible in court for the nontruth purpose of impeaching
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349 (“‘Statements’ has its ordinary meaning, but
would not include evidence (such as videos) that do not constitute a person’s intent to
make factual assertions, or to the extent that such evidence does not contain a person’s
statements.”).
188 Id.
189 Dep’t of Educ., The New Title IX Rule: Excluding Reliance on a Party’s “Statements”
When the Sexual Harassment at Issue Consists of Verbal Conduct, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
BLOG
(May
22,
2020),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/blog/
20200522.html.
190 FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
186
187
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the first witness with evidence that contradicts their testimony. The
new Title IX regulations do not address this issue. On the one hand, the
ban on uncross-examined statements is phrased absolutely. On the
other hand, the new Title IX regulations require opportunities to
impeach and emphasize the importance of assessing credibility, and the
agency might characterize such statements as not factual assertions and
thus outside of the ban.191 The emphasis on credibility evidence
arguably supports admission of uncross-examined statements for
impeachment purposes. It is difficult, however, to keep the purposes of
evidence separate. In the example above, it is difficult not to consider
the statement of the second witness as evidence of its truth (no
harassment occurred at the basketball game), for which purpose it is
completely barred unless the second witness submits to crossexamination.
b. Hearsay Exceptions
The Federal Rules of Evidence for trials also include dozens of
categories of hearsay evidence that may be admitted because they are
generally reliable.192 These rules of evidence allow for testing a hearsay
declarant’s credibility by permitting impeachment of their credibility to
the same extent as testifying witnesses.193 For example, the “business
records” exception194 permits admission of evidence such as transcripts
(which might show academic impact of misconduct on the complainant
and therefore whether the respondent’s behavior is prohibited sexual
misconduct because it deprived the complainant of equal access to the
educational program), and other routine school records. The new Title
IX regulations reject this approach. The Preamble specifically mentions
police records and medical records, indicating that statements in such
records are admissible only if the maker(s) submit(s) to live crossexamination at the hearing.195 Technically, an academic transcript
191 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i). A more accurate characterization might be that
these words are not offered as an assertion, but as words with special legal significance
(they are the alleged harassment) offered for a nonhearsay purpose.
192 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
193 FED. R. EVID. 806.
194 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
195 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349 (“Thus, police reports, SANE reports, medical
reports, and other documents and records may not be relied on to the extent that they
contain the statements of a party or witness who has not submitted to cross-examination.
While documentary evidence such as police reports or hospital records may have been
gathered during investigation and, if directly related to the allegations inspected and
reviewed by the parties, and to the extent they are relevant, summarized in the
investigative report, the hearing is the parties’ first opportunity to argue to the decisionmaker about the credibility and implications of such evidence. Probing the credibility
and reliability of statements asserted by witnesses contained in such evidence requires
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includes “statements” of many persons, such as the faculty who
submitted the individual grades recorded on the transcript. It may be
that each faculty member must be willing to submit to crossexamination to admit the transcript. Yet, as it is only the opportunity to
cross that is required, a workaround might be to make a record at the
hearing that the faculty are available for cross-examination, and the
opposing party indicates that they do not wish to cross-examine these
faculty.
c. Party Wrongdoing Causing Unavailability for CrossExamination
The Federal Rules of Evidence for trials also deal with situations
where a party’s wrongdoing causes unavailability of testimony, such as
threatening or even harming a prospective witness. In such a case, the
trial rules provide that the prospective witness’s out of court statements
may be admitted,196 reasoning that otherwise the wrongdoer benefits
from the misconduct. This approach also complies with Confrontation
Clause requirements when hearsay is admitted against criminal
defendants.197
The Preamble mentions wrongful procurement of absence,
indicating that schools “must remedy” this retaliation, and suggesting
schools could do so by rescheduling the hearing after taking safety
precautions.198 The Preamble does not address admissibility of
evidence in this situation. Again, there are arguments both for and
against admission. The ban on statements without opportunity for
cross-examination is phrased absolutely. On the other hand, the
regulation on retaliation199 clearly bans interference with witness
availability and testimony, and it seems inappropriate to reward
retaliatory conduct by banning out of court statements by prospective
witnesses who are not available due to party wrongdoing.
iv. Constitutional Requirements in Criminal Trials
In criminal trials, the Confrontation Clause operates as a
constitutional bar on prosecutor admission of “testimonial” hearsay
against criminal defendants unless there is an opportunity for crossexamination.200 Testimonial hearsay is a statement made for the
the parties to have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses making the
statements.”) (emphasis added).
196 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
197 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:31.
198 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,346–47.
199 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71.
200 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:27.
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primary purpose of establishing facts for use in later proceedings.201
While Title IX hearings are not criminal proceedings, statements made
to the investigator during a Title IX investigation arguably are
“testimonial.” On the other hand, a party or witness statement to a
friend or parent about what happened is not testimonial and is not
constitutionally barred in a criminal prosecution, even if there was no
opportunity to cross-examine.202 Moreover, the Confrontation Clause
has exceptions, notably including the statements of defendant parties
and their agents and co-conspirators, and situations where the
defendant’s misconduct caused the witness’s unavailability for
testimony and cross-examination.203 The new Title IX regulations do
not adopt this approach. As comments on the proposed regulations
noted, much evidence that would be admissible in a criminal
prosecution of a respondent is not admissible in the school Title IX
hearing.204 The Preamble recognizes this reality as well.205
v. Impact of the Ban
Inadmissibility of uncross-examined evidence likely makes
proving or defending responsibility quite difficult for the parties and,
given the presumption of innocence and burden of proof, especially
challenging for complainants.206 If a respondent confessed outside of
the hearing and then refused to submit to live cross-examination at the
hearing, their confession must be excluded.207 This creates many
strategic options for respondents, for example to: “further a disruptive
agenda—e.g., at an inopportune time for third-party witnesses[,]. . . .
[and to] speak freely to his or her peers about the investigation to collect
Id.
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:30.
203 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 8:31.
204 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,344.
205 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,313.
206 A federal district court has noted the near-impossibility to prove responsibility
with the ban. Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104, 2021 WL 3185743, at*47–
48 (D. Mass. July 28, 2021) (“When . . . the school has elected to apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard given the ‘high stakes and potentially life-altering
consequences for both parties,’ . . . this Court is hard pressed to imagine how a
complainant reasonably could overcome the presumption of non-responsibility to attain
anything beyond the supportive measures that he or she is offered when they first file
the formal complaint.”).
207 See Aaron Bayer et al., Conducting a Live Hearing with Cross-Examination Under
the New Title IX Rules, NAT’L L. REV. (May 26, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/conducting-live-hearing-cross-examination-under-new-title-ix-rules;
Nicole
Bedera et al., A New Title IX Rule Essentially Allows Accused Sexual Assailants to Hide
Evidence Against Them, TIME (Aug. 14, 2020), https://time.com/5879262/devos-title-ixrule/.
201
202
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evidence or even to persuade other witnesses not to attend the
hearing.”208 It also suggests an approach for respondents’ attorneys:
“No attorney worth her salt, recognizing that—were her client simply
not to show up for the hearing—an ironclad bar would descend,
suppressing any inculpatory statements her client might have made to
the police or third parties, would hesitate so to advise.”209 Similarly, a
complainant who confided outside of the hearing that they were not
sure what happened, or not sure who did it, can also keep that statement
from admission at the hearing by not submitting to cross-examination.
In both instances, one party may not know whether the other will testify
prior to the hearing, which makes it difficult to prepare. Moreover,
statements by eyewitnesses who will not or cannot testify, even perhaps
because of death, are excluded. And as discussed earlier, the school and
decision-maker cannot compel testimony.210
4. Impeachment Evidence
Cross-examination questions to impeach witnesses are clearly
relevant.211 The Preamble notes that impeachment of witnesses must
be permitted: “the decision-maker(s) must permit each party’s advisor
to ask the other party and any witnesses all relevant questions and
follow-up questions, including those challenging credibility.”212 The
new regulations ban one method of credibility assessment by decisionmakers; they may not evaluate credibility due to a witness’s status, such
as complainant or respondent, and associated general beliefs about
credibility.213
i. Impeachment Techniques
In litigation, the main impeachment approaches include: (1) bias214
(a witness may have reason not to offer impartial testimony; for
example, an eyewitness for the complainant or an alibi witness for the
respondent may be a friend, or an expert witness may have ideological
bias or a party has paid them for their testimony); (2) capacity215 (a
witness’s ability to perceive or remember is limited; for example, an
eyewitness was standing far away in poor lighting, was not wearing
Victim Rts. L. Ctr., 2021 WL 3185743, at *15.
Id. at *16.
210 Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(1).
211 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
212 Id.
213 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(ii) (“[C]redibility determinations may not be based on a
person’s status as a complainant, respondent, or witness.”).
214 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§ 6:26, 6:75–79.
215 See generally id. §§ 6:26, 6:75, 6:80.
208
209
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their eyeglasses, or was intoxicated); (3) contradiction of a witness’s
testimony by other evidence216 (for example, after the complainant
testifies they tore the respondent’s shirt, the untorn shirt is offered as
evidence, or after the complainant testifies the assault caused academic
difficulty, a transcript is offered showing no decline in grades); (4) prior
inconsistent statements by the witness217 (the witness told a story
shared outside of the hearing—perhaps in the school interview, in a
police statement, or talking to a friend—that is different from their
testimony in the hearing); and (5) a witness’s poor character for
truthfulness (for example, the witness has a perjury or fraud conviction,
or is known to be dishonest, or has lied or otherwise been dishonest in
the past).218 Presumably, questions aimed to impeach in each of these
ways would be admissible in Title IX hearings.
ii. Extrinsic Impeachment Evidence
Impeachment may involve not only cross-examination of a witness,
but also other “extrinsic” or independent evidence—whether physical
(such as the torn shirt), documentary (such as the transcript), or
witnesses called to impeach (such as a friend to whom a witness told a
story that differs from testimony or who can offer an opinion about the
witness’s character for truthfulness). The new regulations only mention
questions to the witness about “credibility,”219 and the Preamble does
not address extrinsic impeachment evidence. Given the focus on the
importance of challenging credibility, the low standard of relevance, and
the mention in the Preamble of admission of character evidence in
various forms, such as prior bad acts, it seems appropriate to admit
extrinsic evidence to impeach in Title IX hearings. The Federal Rules of
Evidence for trials establish limits for extrinsic evidence depending on
the type of impeachment.220 Given the normal approach of not limiting
evidence in school hearings to admissible trial evidence, the reality that
decision-makers will often not be attorneys, the importance of
credibility, and the low standard for relevance, it would not seem
appropriate to import these extrinsic evidence format limits into Title
IX hearings.
Much less clear is whether extrinsic impeachment evidence is
admissible in a Title IX hearing if its declarant does not submit to live
216
217

102.

See generally id. §§ 6:26, 6:75, 6:85–6:90.
See FED. R. EVID. 613; see generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§ 6:98–

218 See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609; see generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, §§
6:29–57.
219 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
220 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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cross-examination. For example, it is unclear whether a witness’s
perjury conviction, or a document reporting a friend of a party was told
a story by a party that differs from the party’s testimony, would be
barred if the declarant (the judge issuing the conviction or the friend,
respectively) did not submit to live cross-examination. The competing
arguments include the absolute ban on statements made by persons
who do not submit to cross-examination, that evidence offered solely to
impeach is not a statement offered for its truth and is thus arguably
outside the ban as discussed above,221 and the new regulations’
emphasis on the need to assess credibility.
iii. Bolstering
The new regulations and Preamble also do not address whether
questions designed to enhance a witness’s credibility can be asked
before that witness’s credibility has been attacked. The rules of
evidence for trials do not allow this “bolstering,”222 but the lesser
formality of Title IX hearings and the new regulations’ underlying basis
of the essentialness of evaluating witness credibility seem inconsistent
with a ban on bolstering.
5. Expert Witnesses
The new regulations note the parties’ right to present expert
witnesses,223 who in trials are allowed to offer opinions on a wide
variety of subjects. The school might identify some experts, such as
police officers, in its investigation; a party might independently identify
others. In trials, experts are generally not allowed to offer opinions
about whether a witness is testifying truthfully,224 nor about the law,225
because those matters are the province of the fact-finder and trial judge,
respectively. As to witness truthfulness, courts sometimes allow expert
opinions about general matters, such as reliability of eyewitness
identification or perhaps markers of veracity or deception.226 The new
regulations and Preamble do not address these issues, nor other
matters, such as sufficient qualifications to testify as an expert.

221
222
223
224
225
226

See supra Section II.C.3.iii.a.
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 6:91.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(ii).
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 6:32.
Id. § 7:12.
Id. § 6:82.
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6. Character Evidence
The rules of evidence for trials generally forbid character evidence
in civil trials for propensity purposes.227 For example, in a car accident
negligence case, evidence that the defendant is a poor driver or had
prior accidents is inadmissible to show the driver drove negligently at
the time of the accident. Courts generally regard the logical relevance
of such evidence as low and its potential for unfair prejudice as high.
The new Title IX regulations address certain sexual history character
evidence with the rape shield and the admissibility of prior sexual
misconduct by the respondent.228 The new regulations are silent about
character evidence generally, but the Preamble suggests that schools
may not make rules banning character evidence and also suggests that
character evidence, including prior bad acts, is admissible.229 Certainly
the respondent’s character is relevant to what sanctions may be
appropriate if found responsible. The Preamble suggests the parties’
character is admissible more generally as to both responsibility
(whether the alleged sexual misconduct happened) and credibility
(whether a party or key witness is believable).230 The Federal Rules of
Evidence do allow criminal defendants to introduce certain character
evidence.231 Schools may wish to create rules that nonsexual character
evidence should be given little weight for propensity purposes to avoid
propensity reasoning (such as a respondent is a good person and thus
not likely responsible for sexual misconduct or is a bad person and thus
likely responsible for sexual misconduct).
The rules of evidence for trials also greatly limit the format for
character evidence.232 Generally, the rules allow character witnesses
and certain convictions, but ban evidence of prior bad acts.233 The
Preamble’s approval of admission of prior bad acts suggests that these
format limits do not apply in Title IX hearings.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
229 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,248, 30,294.
230 Id. at 30,248 (stating that schools cannot have rules banning character evidence);
id. at 30,337 (noting that character evidence may go to witness credibility); cf. id. at
30,352 (indicating that respondent’s sexual history may be relevant for propensity
purposes).
231 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
232 See FED. R. EVID. 405.
233 FED. R. EVID. 608, 609, 405(b).
227
228
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7. Stipulations
In school proceedings, agency hearings, and trials, parties may
stipulate as to facts.234 The new regulations and Preamble are silent
about stipulation generally. As to uncross-examined statements
specifically, the Preamble suggests that there can be no waiver of the
requirement of submitting to cross-examination,235 implying that the
parties could not waive the opportunity for cross-examination of, for
example, a therapist who prepared a report about a party. In some
circumstances, however, a workaround might be to make a record at the
hearing that the therapist is available for cross-examination, and the
opposing party indicates that they do not wish to cross-examine.
8. Taking Notice
Courts and other decision makers, such as administrative hearing
officers and arbitrators, may “notice” facts that are beyond reasonable
dispute.236 The new regulations and Preamble are silent on this issue. A
Title IX decision-maker might decide to notice facts; for example, when
an eyewitness testifies that they saw an assault in the middle of the
campus quad from their dorm window, the decision-maker might take
notice of the distance between the dorm window and the middle of the
quad. Doing so on the record at the hearing would give the parties a
chance to be heard as to any dispute about the noticed fact.
9. Other Constitutional Admissibility Issues
The new Title IX regulations explicitly provide that they do not
require schools to deprive persons of their due process rights.237 Of
course, parties to Title IX hearings in public schools are due some
process, which a court may determine to be more than the school
provides; some courts have found that Title IX processes alleged at some
public colleges would not provide due process to accused students.238
In a Title IX hearing, a party might argue a due process right to present
otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as an uncross-examined
statement. In an older case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant has a due process right to offer a third-party’s reliable
confession to committing the crime the defendant is being prosecuted
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 121, § 4:67.
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,349 (“[T]he Department declines to allow a party or
witness to ‘waive’ a question because such a rule would circumvent the benefits and
purposes of cross-examination as a truth-seeking tool for postsecondary institutions’
Title IX adjudications.”).
236 FED. R. EVID. 201.
237 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(d)(2).
238 See infra Section III.B.2.
234
235
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for, even if the confession is not otherwise admissible under the
evidence rules.239 A respondent might argue a due process right to
introduce a third party confession to the sexual misconduct at issue in
the Title IX hearing, even if the third party will not submit to crossexamination.
On due process more generally, complainants might argue that the
new regulations’ complete ban on uncross-examined statements—
coupled with the lack of subpoena power to compel witnesses to appear
and submit to cross-examination and the high burden of proof—
amounts to a violation of their due process rights. One of the lawsuits
challenging the new regulations argues that this combination, in light of
the reality that the females are the overwhelming majority of
complainants, is unconstitutional gender discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.240
10. Argument About Weight to Be Assigned to the Evidence
in a Hearing
The Preamble indicates that parties must be given an opportunity
to argue the weight that a decision-maker should accord to admitted
evidence.241 The Preamble suggests that this could be accomplished
with an opportunity for closing statements.242
D. Challenges to Admissibility Determinations
1. Satellite Title IX Claims
The new regulations assert that Title IX is violated if a school does
not follow the required formal complaint procedures for a claimant or
respondent.243 Parties may argue admissibility rulings at hearings
violate Title IX. Parties may file lawsuits, complaints with the enforcing
Office of Civil Rights, or both.244

Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (noting, however, the “unique
circumstances” of a murder case and suggesting opinion was fact-specific).
240 See generally Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-11104, 2020 WL 5700819 (D.
Mass. Aug. 5, 2020).
241 2020 Q & A, supra note 19, at 9–10 (Parties must have “the opportunity to provide
input and make arguments about the relevance of evidence and how a decision-maker
should weigh the evidence.”).
242 Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,303 (Parties must be able to make “arguments to
the decision-maker regarding the relevance of evidence and the weight or credibility of
relevant evidence.”).
243 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(a).
244 34 C.F.R. § 106.81; Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992).
239
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2. Internal Appeals
Schools must offer internal hearing appeals on at least some
grounds, including a “[p]rocedural irregularity that affected the
outcome of the matter,”245 new evidence not available at the hearing that
“could affect the outcome of the matter,”246 and bias, from a Title IX
Coordinator, investigator, or decision-maker, toward a party or toward
respondents or complainants generally “that affected the outcome of the
matter.”247 Thus, a party might appeal admissibility rulings as
procedural regularities or bias that affected the outcome. Recent nonbinding guidance from the agency suggests that parties may pursue
appeals even after their enrollment or employment ends.248
3. Non-Title IX Litigation
Parties in public college Title IX hearings might claim that
admissibility rules or rulings in their hearings violated their due
process, equal protection, or other constitutional rights.249 Parties in
private college Title IX hearings might make analogous breach of
contract claims.250
III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE STANDARDS FOR TITLE IX HEARINGS ARE
INSUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND FAIL TO ACHIEVE THE AGENCY’S STATED GOALS
The rules of admission established by the new Title IX regulations
are based on public policies identified by the agency: due process and
fairness for respondents251 given the serious consequences of being
found responsible for sexual misconduct;252 the need to treat
complainants and respondents equally;253 the importance of credibility
assessment, specifically through the crucible of live crossexamination;254 and the reality that schools are not courtrooms and
decision-makers in hearings are neither trained judges nor attorneys.255
Often these policies are in tension with one another, limiting their ability
to resolve gaps and omissions in the new standards. Moreover, the
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(8)(i)(A).
Id. § 106.45(b)(8)(i)(B).
247 Id. § 106.45(b)(8)(i)(C).
248 2021 Q & A Part II, supra note 19, at 10.
249 See infra Section III.B.2.
250 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2020) (requiring some
form of cross-examination under school policy but reserving details).
251 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,046–55.
252 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,329, 30,381.
253 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,242–46.
254 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,311–14.
255 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,336–38.
245
246
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approach to evidence in the new regulations is not consistent with the
agency’s own public policy goals. One court found that the ban on
uncross-examined statements, in combination with other protections
for respondents, “render the most vital and ultimate hallmark of the
investigation—the hearing—a remarkably hollow gesture,”256
inconsistent with the agency’s own goals.257
A. Admission of Evidence Standards for Title IX Hearings Are Not
Sufficiently Clear
The approach to admissibility of evidence in Title IX hearings
leaves many issues partially or fully unresolved. Schools, their Title IX
Coordinators, investigators, and decision-makers, and the parties and
their advisors have much to learn about and try to puzzle out, and much
to argue about in Title IX hearings. Unresolved admissibility issues in
Title IX hearings include fundamental ones, such as whether evidence
offered for a nontruth purpose is subject to the ban on uncrossexamined statements,258 whether and under what circumstances
extrinsic evidence to impeach is admissible,259 and whether decisionmakers may admit uncross-examined statements where unavailability
for cross-examination resulted from party wrongdoing.260 While a nonbinding Preamble addresses some unresolved issues, these and others
are not addressed. Reviewing the new regulations’ varied policy
underpinnings often counsels different and inconsistent admissibility
standards.261 Similarly, Title IX admissibility standards in some
respects are modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence for trials and in
other respects are not. But the agency is clear that it does not think
schools and Title IX hearing decision-makers have the expertise
required to implement trial evidence rules. It is thus unclear whether
and when the trial rules approach can offer helpful guidance on Title IX
issues.
256 Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104, 2021 WL 3185743, at *15 (D. Mass.
July 28, 2021).
257 Id. at *16 (“The Department goes to great lengths to solidify the hearing as the
hallmark of the Title IX process, essential to the goals of fact finding, weighing credibility,
and a ‘fair grievance process leading to reliable outcomes. . . .’ To so carefully balance
and craft the respondent’s safeguards, the definitions, the burdens, and the policies in
the run-up to the hearing, just to have the prohibition and definition of absentee
statements render the hearing a hollow exercise . . . .”).
258 See supra Section II.C.3.iii.a.
259 See supra Section II.C.4.ii.
260 See supra Section II.C.3.iii.c.
261 Other examples of this inconsistency include what are banned hearsay
“statements,” see supra Section II.C.3.iii.a, and admissibility of hearsay when witness
unavailability is caused by party wrongdoing, see supra Section II.C.3.iii.c.
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B. The Title IX Hearing Ban on Uncross-Examined Statements Is
Not Required by Due Process
The new regulations require a very formal adversarial hearing that
excludes statements made by persons who do not submit to full crossexamination.262 This broad ban on uncross-examined statements, which
is tantamount to a hearsay ban unless the statement’s maker (termed
the “declarant” in the rules of evidence for trials) testifies as a witness,
is an unprecedented deviation from: (1) normal practices and public
school due process requirements for school discipline generally and
Title IX specifically, (2) the new regulations’ approach for K-12 school
formal complaints, (3) the practice in administrative hearings, (4) the
rules of evidence for trials, and (5) even the constitutional limits on
admission of hearsay against criminal defendants. And the ban is not
required to provide due process to respondents.263
Procedural due process and other constitutional rights are rights
as to the government and so do not apply to private schools and colleges,
but the new regulations apply equally to public and private schools.264
In public schools and colleges, due process is triggered by a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property.265 In the world of K–12 education, state laws
guarantee a right to attend school, and so student suspension or
expulsion involves a deprivation of a property right.266 In higher
education, there is no abstract legal right to attend a public college, but
admission and payment of tuition may create a property right. Injury to
reputation is not facially a due process liberty deprivation.267 When
reputation is damaged, accompanied by concrete consequences such as
loss of a job, however, a due process liberty deprivation may be
involved.268 If there is a deprivation, what process is due is sorted out

See supra Section II.C.3.
See generally Dowling, supra note 13.
264 The Preamble recognizes this limit. Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,052.
265 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§
7.3.2–7.3.3 (6th ed. 2019) (discussing property and liberty deprivations respectively).
266 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
267 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976).
268 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 265, § 7.3.3 (discussing liberty deprivations
involving reputation).
262
263
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by a balancing test weighing the private interests at stake269 against risk
of error270 and government burdens.271
1. Due Process in Public K–12 School Proceedings
The U.S. Supreme Court requires “rudimentary” due process for K12 student suspensions of ten days or less (a property deprivation of the
state law right to attend school).272 Rudimentary due process requires
a short informal meeting with notice of the charges, a general summary
of the evidence if the charges are denied, and a chance for the student to
tell their side.273 The student has no right to hear, present, or crossexamine witnesses.274 The Court found a liberty deprivation involved in
student corporal punishment, but held that post-punishment tort claims
offer sufficient due process, and hence pre-punishment rudimentary
due process is not required.275 The Court noted that “[h]earings—even
informal hearings—require time, personnel, and a diversion of
attention from normal school pursuits.”276
The Court has not addressed due process requirements for K–12
student expulsions and lengthy suspensions (property deprivations of
larger magnitude given the longer exclusion from school). The
consensus of the lower courts is that an evidentiary hearing is
required.277 While some courts found that due process requires the
accused student in certain school expulsion hearings to have an

269 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). Several commentators suggest
the interest of the victim and not only the interest of the respondent should be weighed
here. See, e.g., Sage Carson & Sarah Nesbitt, Balancing the Scales: Student Survivors’
Interests and the Mathews Analysis, 43 HARV. J. L. &. GENDER 319, 372–74 (2020); Hannah
Walsh, Further Harm and Harassment: The Cost of Excess Process to Victims of Sexual
Violence on College Campuses, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1803–05 (2020).
270 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. Some commentators suggest the risk of error
without cross-examination is low, in light of statistical evidence that there is a low rate
of false rape reporting. See, e.g., Hunter Davis, Symbolism over Substance: The Role of
Adversarial Cross-Examination in Campus Sexual Assault Adjudications and the Legality
of the Proposed Rulemaking on Title IX, 27 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 213, 242–44 (2020).
271 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35; see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 265, § 7.4
(discussing what process is due in education and other contexts).
272 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
273 Id. at 581–82 (“Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying
for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”) (emphasis added).
274 Id.
275 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977).
276 Id. at 680.
277 See generally RAPP, supra note 80, at § 9.09.
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opportunity to cross-examine victims,278 generally courts have allowed
hearsay statements of others and have not required an opportunity for
cross-examination.279 Notably, the new Title IX regulations do not ban
uncross-examined statements from meetings to resolve formal Title IX
complaints at K–12 schools, apparently recognizing that this ban is not
a due process requirement.280
2. Due Process in Public College Discipline
At the college level, the U.S. Supreme Court found that crossexamination and an evidentiary hearing is not required for academic
discipline281 but has not addressed cross-examination or other due
process requirements for misconduct discipline. In an academic
discipline case, the Court noted that “[t]he educational process is not by
nature adversar[ial]”282 and declined to “formalize the academic
dismissal process by requiring a hearing. . . . [and] further enlarge the
judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk
deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student
relationship,”283 suggesting some reluctance to require adversarial
school hearings. Some courts have found that expulsion from a public
college is a property deprivation.284 One decision by now-Justice Amy
Coney Barrett noted a circuit split on property deprivation in these
circumstances.285 That court found a liberty deprivation in a Title IX
case where a student was suspended for a year for sexual misconduct
and lost his Reserve Officer Training Corps (“ROTC”) scholarship;286
notably, the opinion does not assert that all Title IX public school formal
hearings involve due process liberty or property deprivations.287

278 See, e.g., Stone v. Prosser Consol. Sch. Dist., 971 P.2d 125, 127–28 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999) (finding that due process and state statute require a student facing expulsion to
be able to question his alleged victims; school administrator’s summary of their
experiences is insufficient).
279 See generally RAPP, supra note 80, at § 9.09 (noting that “[a]bsent a statutory
requirement that cross-examination be allowed, the decided trend of courts is now to
allow the use of written witness reports and statements.”).
280 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii).
281 Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85–91 (1978); cf. Regents
of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985) (finding no constitutional violation
where medical student was academically dismissed without a hearing).
282 Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.
283 Id.
284 See, e.g., Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2019).
285 Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 659 n.2 (7th Cir. 2019).
286 Id. at 663.
287 Id. at 659.
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A recent wave of cases brought by Title IX respondents examines
Title IX due process requirements.288 Some recent Sixth Circuit and
other federal appellate Title IX and other misconduct discipline
decisions find that the due process rights of accused students in public
colleges require an opportunity for the respondent or their agent to
cross-examine the victim and other witnesses under some
circumstances.289 Other decisions hold that questioning by the decisionmaker, after a party has had an opportunity to submit written questions,
is sufficient, similar to the approach of the new regulations for K–12
schools.290 And in contrast to the agency’s guidance requiring unlimited
cross (all questions on cross must be answered or the witness’s
testimony is barred),291 the Sixth Circuit most recently held that due
process does not require a witness to answer every question on cross.292
Instead, the court found that where credibility is in dispute, some form
of cross that allowed the decision-maker to evaluate credibility and
assess demeanor was sufficient for due process,293 noting that unlimited
cross could result in harassment of a witness.294 One federal appeals
court found that a private college’s student handbook language
providing in part for a “fair” and “equitable” disciplinary process

288 For a summary of these cases, see Samantha Harris & KC Johnson, Campus Courts
in Court: The Rise in Judicial Involvement in Campus Sexual Misconduct Adjudications, 22
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 49 (2019) (noting more than 500 lawsuits since 2011,
more than 90 losses by defendant colleges, and more than 70 cases settled).
289 See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581–85 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that at public
college that provides for cross-examination in student misconduct discipline cases
generally, in sexual assault case which turns on credibility, cross-examination of victim
by accused student or their agent is required); Haidak, 933 F.3d at 69 (finding that due
process does not require cross of victim by accused student, but due process does
require some opportunity to question the victim by the decision-maker; rejecting the
Baum approach); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017). A recent
decision by now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett reserves the issue of whether due process
requires cross-examination. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 664 n.4. See generally Diane
Heckman, The Proliferation of Title IX Collegiate Mishandling Cases Involving Sexual
Misconduct Between 2016–2018: The March to the Federal Circuit Courts, 358 EDUC. L. REP.
697 (2018); Amy R. LaMendola, School’s or School Official’s Liability for Unfair
Disciplinary Action Against Student Accused of Sexual Harassment or Assault, 34 A.L.R. 7th
1 (2017 & Supp.).
290 See Haidak, 933 F.3d at 69–70.
291 2020 Q & A, supra note 19, at 9 (“Conversely, if a party or witness answers one, or
some, but not all, relevant cross-examination questions asked by a party’s advisor at the
live hearing, then that party or witness has not submitted to cross-examination and that
party’s or witness’s statements cannot be relied on by the decision-maker.”).
292 Doe v. Mich. State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 427 (6th Cir. 2021).
293 Id. at 429–32 (determining that Mathews v. Eldridge balancing does not require
unlimited cross-examination).
294 Id. at 431–32.

DAGGETT (DO NOT DELETE)

48

10/28/21 4:02 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

required an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.295 None of these
decisions extended cross-examination requirements to the makers of
documents, such as medical records and academic transcripts.
3. Administrative Agency Hearings
In an administrative hearing case, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that due process does not bar the introduction of reliable
but uncross-examined hearsay, even approving reliable hearsay as the
primary basis for an agency decision. Specifically, the Court upheld an
agency determination regarding eligibility for social security disability
that was based primarily on the written medical report of a physician
who did not appear at the hearing and was not called by the claimant for
cross-examination.296 The Court reasoned, in part, that medical reports
were generally reliable and admissible in court under the evidence rules
as business records exempt from the general ban on hearsay.297 The
Title IX hearing rules reject this approach. The Court, however, has
found a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in a welfare benefits
hearing, noting the essential nature of welfare benefits for eligible
persons.298
C. Admission of Evidence Standards for Title IX Hearings Do Not
Treat Complainants and Respondents Equally
Indisputably, equitable treatment is required of both complainants,
who are mostly female, and respondents, who are mostly male. Title IX
prohibits gender discrimination and applies to both males and
females.299 The college Title IX cases discussed above address only
alleged defects in process; they do not reach the merits of finding the
respondent responsible for sexual misconduct, nor make findings about
what actual Title IX procedures the defendant-colleges used.300 The
practices alleged at some schools do appear unfair to respondents.301
295 Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 211–12, 215 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that
some form of cross-examination is required but reserving details).
296 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
297 Id. at 403–04 (noting reliability of medical reports); id. at 405 (referring to
admissibility of medical reports at trials although hearsay).
298 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–70 (1970) (determining that in welfare
benefits context, due process requires opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses).
299 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see RAPP, supra note 80, at § 10B.01[5][c].
300 See supra Section III.B.2.
301 See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2019) (alleging
college did not provide access to evidence, hearing panel determined complainant who
did not appear at the hearing was nonetheless credible, and several hearing panel
members did not read the investigation report).
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This inequity may explain the new regulations as a reaction to alleged
procedures at some schools that treated respondents unfairly. If so, the
reaction overcompensates in a way substantially unfair to
complainants.
On a facial level, the new approach treats complainants and
respondents equally, with limited exceptions and accommodations,
such as the presumption of innocence for respondents,302 creation of a
rape shield limited to complainants,303 potential adoption of a burden of
proof that favors respondents,304 and having party advisors rather than
parties themselves conduct cross-examination (perhaps remotely) to
minimize trauma to complainants.305 In practice and application,
however, treatment is not equal, perhaps resulting in part from the
agency’s close work with men’s rights groups in conceptualizing and
drafting the new regulations.306 A federal district court recognized the
reality that complainants and respondents are not treated equally,
noting that when a respondent chooses not to testify
the hearing officer is prohibited from hearing any evidence
other than the testimony of the complainant, and . . . cannot
draw a negative inference from the absence of the respondent,
. . . . While the complainant must attend the hearing for his or
her evidence to be admitted, he or she can be cross-examined
and discredited by the absent respondent’s attorney, . . . with
little to no hope of evidentiary rehabilitation. When the
foregoing occurs and the school has elected to apply the clear
and convincing evidence standard given the ‘high stakes and
potentially life-altering consequences for both parties,’. . . this
Court is hard pressed to imagine how a complainant
reasonably could overcome the presumption of nonresponsibility to attain anything beyond the supportive
measures that he or she is offered when they first file the
formal complaint. . . . This is not some extreme outlier or
fanciful scenario.307
Notably, the new regulations evince a conspicuous pattern of
borrowing trial evidence approaches, then modifying them in ways that
make the process difficult for complainants. First, although Title IX
See supra Section II.B.4.
See supra Section II.C.2.iii.
304 See supra Section II.B.4.
305 See supra Section II.B.5.
306 See Hélène Barthélemy, How Men’s Rights Groups Helped Rewrite Regulations on
Campus Rape, NATION (Aug. 14, 2020), https://thenation.com/article/politics/betsydevos-title-ix-mens-rights/.
307 Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. 20-cv-11104, 2021 WL 3185743, at *15–16 (D.
Mass. July 28, 2021).
302
303
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hearings are civil, and are not trials, schools may be required to adopt a
clear and convincing burden of proof rather than the normal civil
standard of preponderance of evidence,308 making it more difficult to
prove a respondent is responsible. Second, the regulations model their
newly created rape shield309 on rules of evidence for criminal trials
rather than the provisions for civil trials. But in contrast to the criminal
trial provisions, it does not appear to extend to pattern witnesses,
making their participation more difficult and perhaps less likely.
Moreover, information protected by the rape shield must be disclosed
to the respondent, which is also not required in a criminal trial, and
invades the privacy of the complainant. Third, the requirement that
advisors perform cross-examination rather than parties310 seems
helpful to protect complainants from retraumatization on crossexamination, but failure to bar direct examination by parties means that,
for example, a respondent could call a complainant as a witness and
themself conduct a potentially traumatizing direct examination. The
Preamble suggests school policy could limit direct examination to
advisors, but does not require it.311 Fourth, the complete ban on
uncross-examined statements312 goes well beyond the hearsay
exclusion in trials and even greatly exceeds the Confrontation Clause’s
ban on prosecutor introduction of hearsay against actual criminal
defendants. The ban also ignores the reality that respondents are more
likely to have made inculpatory statements outside of the hearing.313
And of course, that ban on uncross-examined statements, in concert
with the burden of proof, makes it difficult to prove responsibility for
sexual misconduct. Fifth, the new regulations adopt some of the trial
rules’ definition of hearsay,314 limiting it to assertive statements, but
notably do not adopt the trial rules’ admission of opposing party
statements, allowing respondents full ability to exclude their
inculpatory statements, even confessions to sexual misconduct. Sixth,
the sensitive nature of the evidence and the privacy interests of both

See supra Section II.B.4.
See supra Section II.C.2.iii.
310 See supra Section II.B.5.
311 Id.
312 See supra Section II.C.3.
313 This reality is discussed in Nicole Bedera et al., A New Title IX Rule Essentially
Allows Accused Sexual Assailants to Hide Evidence Against Them, TIME (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://time.com/5879262/devos-title-ix-rule/.
314 See supra Section II.C.3.iii.a.
308
309

DAGGETT (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/28/21 4:02 PM

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

51

parties and, in particular, complainants, also must be considered.315 The
investigation may gather sensitive information about both parties and
pattern witnesses, such as their statements about what happened, their
sexual history/character, and with consent, their treatment records.316
Parties control school access to their own treatment records, but this
does not extend to treatment records of pattern witnesses that might
help prove the complainant’s allegations.317 All of this information is
shared with both parties and their advisors, with no ban in the new
regulations on re-disclosure of this information.318 The Preamble
suggests schools can require non-disclosure agreements, but does not
require them.319
D. The Admission of Evidence Standards Adopted for Title IX
Hearings Are Neither Necessitated by nor Consistent with the
Reality that Schools Are Not Courtrooms and Decision-Makers
Are Often Not Attorneys
The agency correctly notes that schools are not courtrooms, and
decision-makers in Title IX hearings often will not be judges or
attorneys.320 The new regulations appropriately require training for
decision-makers on relevance and some other evidentiary issues.321
Recognizing this reality, the normal practice in school hearings,
administrative hearings, and arbitration is to shift evidence arguments
from admissibility to weight.322 This means that evidence is normally
admitted, but the parties may argue that because of hearsay status or
similar issues, the decision-maker should accord specific pieces of
evidence little or no weight. The new regulations inconsistently adopt
and reject this default approach to broadly admit evidence in non-trial
proceedings. In some respects, evidence is admitted in Title IX hearings
315 The privacy interests and protections in Title IX formal complaint matters are
explored in Lynn M. Daggett, Student Privacy in the New Title IX Sexual Misconduct
Formal Complaint Process, 50 J. L. & EDUC. 64 (2021).
316 See supra Section II.A.2.
317 See supra Section II.C.2.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,336–38.
321 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii) (“[M]aterials used to train Title IX
Coordinators, investigators, decision-makers, and any person who facilitates an
informal resolution process, must not rely on sex stereotypes and must promote
impartial investigations and adjudications of formal complaints of sexual harassment.”);
§ 106.45(b)(1)(iii) (requiring decision-maker training on relevance).
322 See generally Lynn M. Daggett, Evidentiary Arguments in Proceedings that Are Not
Governed by the Rules of Evidence, LITIG. NEWS (Litig. Section of Wash. State Bar Ass’n),
Spring 2010, at 6.
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that would not be admitted in trial. The Title IX relevance standard is
more akin to logical relevance under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 401,
and the Preamble rejects the practical relevance standard of Federal
Rule of Evidence Rule 403.323 Character evidence, apparently for both
propensity and other purposes and without limitation as to format, is
widely admissible in Title IX hearings, in contrast to the narrow avenues
for its admission at trial.324 Extrinsic impeachment evidence may be
admissible, in contrast to the limits on extrinsic evidence at trial, but it
is unclear whether the ban on uncross-examined statements applies.325
In other respects, the new regulations ban much evidence in Title
IX hearings that would be admissible at trial, most notably the new
regulations’ ban on uncross-examined statements. The Preamble
indicates that the parties cannot waive this requirement,326 and it is also
unclear whether parties can stipulate as to other matters.327 These
latter rules inappropriately limit party autonomy. Finally, the Title IX
rape shield does not appear to protect pattern witnesses, unlike the rape
shield for trials.328
The reasons for this inconsistent approach are unclear. As to the
creation of the ban on uncross-examined statements, the Preamble
asserts that cross-examination is essential to ascertainment of truth.329
Cross-examination, as compared to other impeachment techniques,
does provide an opportunity to assess the demeanor of a witness. Some
commentators suggest that in rape cases, cross-examination is not
significantly helpful in ascertaining truth.330 The Preamble also suggests
the agency had to choose between creating a comprehensive evidence
code for Title IX hearings, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence for trials
in federal court,331 and the bright line approach of the ban on uncrossexamined statements. The agency posits that it is unreasonable to
expect Title IX decision-makers to implement a comprehensive
evidence code, necessitating the agency’s chosen bright line approach.
This is a false dichotomy; in fact, there are many other alternatives. First
and foremost, and as discussed above, the general approach for school
and administrative hearings is to admit evidence including hearsay,
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

151.
331

See supra Section II.C.1.ii.
See supra Section II.C.6.
See supra Section II.C.4.ii.
See supra Section II.C.3.
See supra Section II.C.7.
See supra Section II.C.2.iii.
See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,311–14.
A recent summary of this commentary is provided by Dowling, supra note 13, at
Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,347.
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allowing the parties to argue what weight it should be accorded given
its hearsay or other status.332 Second, the requirement of crossexamination could be limited, perhaps to witnesses who testify at
hearings. Third, and notwithstanding the right to participate or not in
hearings, the new regulations could permit inferences to be drawn from
failure to appear and undergo cross-examination, as is permitted in civil
trials. Fourth, a very limited set of hearsay exceptions could be created,
perhaps for example, an exception for business records and another for
the statements of opposing parties. Finally, as some commentators
suggest, the decision-maker could test credibility by inquisitorial
questioning, with an opportunity for parties to submit questions, rather
than adversarial cross-examination by parties or their agents.333 This
last approach is consistent with the new regulations’ approach to
resolution of formal complaints at K-12 schools.334
The agency’s concern for limited evidentiary expertise of Title IX
decision-makers is also undercut by the evidentiary issues the new
regulations require decision-makers to resolve. Title IX decisionmakers must resolve relevance issues.335 Decision-makers must also
resolve other evidence subtleties, such as whether evidence is truly a
statement,336 and thus inadmissible hearsay unless the declarant fully
submits to cross-examination; whether evidence is protected by a
privilege and if so whether privilege has been waived;337 whether
evidence falls within one of the two exceptions to the rape shield;338 and
whether an uncross-examined statement is relevant to issues beyond
determination of responsibility339 and thus not subject to the ban. And
in these and other instances when the decision-maker determines
evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible, the decision-maker must
offer on-the-record and contemporaneous reasoning.340 Even trial

See supra Section III.B.
Dowling, supra note 13, at 166; Ilana Frier, Campus Sexual Assault and Due Process,
15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 117, 136-40 (2020); Hannah Walsh, Further Harm
and Harassment: The Cost of Excess Process to Victims of Sexual Violence on College
Campuses, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1807-08 (2020). This was the approach taken in
earlier agency guidance, since rescinded. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence 31 (Apr. 29, 2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
334 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii).
335 See supra Section II.C.1.
336 See supra Section II.C.3.iii.
337 See supra Section II.C.2.ii.
338 See supra Section II.C.2.iii.
339 See supra Section II.C.3.i.
340 See supra Section II.C.1.i.
332
333
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judges are not required to offer on-the-record reasoning for their
evidentiary rulings.341
E. Admission of Evidence Standards for Title IX Hearings Do Not
Fully Reflect the Centrality of Credibility in These Hearings
The agency correctly notes that campus sexual misconduct cases
often have no forensic evidence or eyewitnesses, and hence the
credibility of the parties is uniquely central.342 The new regulations
appropriately make clear that questions to witnesses about credibility
are relevant.343
The agency also appropriately recognizes the
importance of cross-examination to assess credibility. But it does not
follow that cross-examination is required for all statements—not just
the statements of parties but as the agency suggests, even the makers of
medical records,344 and perhaps even the faculty whose grades are
recorded on a party’s transcript. Some of the alternatives to a complete
ban on uncross-examined statements are set forth above.345
Moreover, and as discussed above, other important and commonly
used techniques test credibility in trials: bias, capacity, contradiction,
prior inconsistent statements, and character for truthfulness.346 The
trial rules of evidence are premised on a belief that these impeachment
techniques can provide a fair opportunity to assess credibility, even
when live cross-examination is not available. Given the agency’s
recognition of the importance of credibility, the new regulations’
complete failure to address these fundamental impeachment
techniques, and to offer guidance on admissibility of extrinsic evidence
to impeach and whether such evidence offered for impeachment
purposes is subject to the ban on uncross-examined statements,347 is
quite surprising.
F. Admission of Evidence Standards for Title IX Hearings Do Not
Create a Hearing Process that Is Fair or Equitable
The current approach to admissibility of evidence in Title IX
hearings does not seem to offer the equitable resolution required by

341
342
343
344
345
346
347

See supra Section II.C.1.i.
See, e.g., Preamble, supra note 2, at 30,311–14.
See supra Section II.C.4.
See supra Section II.C.4.
See supra Section III.0.
See supra Section II.C.4.i.
See supra Section II.C.4.
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Title IX for its grievance processes generally,348 nor the fair and
impartial349 resolution required by Clery Act regulations, which apply to
some of the offenses covered by the new Title IX regulations.
Respondents do not have control over becoming parties to Title IX
hearings. Respondents can choose not to participate, but the potential
disciplinary consequences—up to and including expulsion—are
powerful incentives to participate and advocate. Complainants decide
whether to file formal complaints, but in some cases Title IX
Coordinators or parents will file; even in this event, the complainant
may choose not to participate.350 Complainants who do not file formal
complaints, or who do not participate, face different consequences than
respondents. Complainants do not face discipline themselves, but
instead risk a hearing outcome that finds the respondent not
responsible, or finds the respondent responsible without granting
appropriate sanctions, or does not afford the complainant appropriate
remedies.
Looking at the Title IX hearing process,351 and the admission of
evidence specifically, the disappointing but unescapable reality is that it
is not clear that filing a formal complaint is a good option for
complainants. While the school does the work of gathering evidence,
that evidence involves sensitive information shared with the
respondent and party advisors without a regulatory ban on redisclosure.352 While a rape shield bars admission of complainant sexual
history and reputation, rape shield-protected information must be
shared with the opposing party and party advisors, and no regulatory

348 See former 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (“A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee
complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part.”); current 34
C.F.R. § 106.8(c) (“Adoption of grievance procedures. A recipient must adopt and
publish grievance procedures that provide for the prompt and equitable resolution of
student and employee complaints alleging any action that would be prohibited by this
part and a grievance process that complies with § 106.45 for formal complaints as
defined in § 106.30.”).
349 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(k)(2)(i).
350 See supra Section II.B.2.
351 While beyond the scope of this Article, other seemingly unfair aspects of the new
regulations include new limits on interim relief for complainants, 34 C.F.R. §
106.45(b)(1)(vi); a significantly narrowed definition of sexual harassment, § 106.30(a);
a higher standard for school liability, §§ 106.30 and 106.44(a); dismissal of complaints
for most off-campus harassment, § 106.44(a), or when the respondent is no longer
enrolled or employed, § 106.45(b)(3)(ii), or the complainant is no longer enrolled or
employed, § 106.30(a); and the ability to put the formal complaint process on hold while
criminal investigation or proceedings are pending, § 106.45(b)(1)(v).
352 See supra Section II.A.3.
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ban on re-disclosure exists.353 Depending on school policy, the decisionmaker will have to find the respondent responsible by either the normal
civil preponderance of evidence standard, or by a higher standard of
clear and convincing evidence.354 The school lacks subpoena power to
gather evidence to meet this standard, and the right not to participate in
the hearing means the school cannot compel cooperation of students or
employees through school policies.355 A pattern witness in particular
may be reluctant to participate if they are aware that their sexual history
and character is not protected by the new regulations’ rape shield.356
Moreover, the requirement of consent for school access to treatment
records is limited to parties and does not include pattern witnesses.357
At the hearing, the decision-maker cannot admit statements by
persons who do not fully submit to cross-examination. This exclusion is
a broad one, including the parties’ own statements to the Title IX
investigator or otherwise, witness statements, statements by health
care providers in medical records, and perhaps even statements by
faculty who submitted grades for a party.358 As discussed above, this
ban is not necessary for due process and also is not equitable for either
complainants or respondents.359 In some cases, it will not be possible to
get the makers of statements to agree to submit to cross-examination,
although remote participation is an option.360 Even persons who appear
at the hearing and answer questions on cross may refuse to answer one
or more questions, be deemed not to have submitted fully, and have
their statements excluded.361 The parties can keep their own
statements, even a confession to sexual misconduct or fabrication of
allegations, from admission at the hearing by refusing to submit to
cross-examination. Hence, it will often not be clear even at the outset of
a hearing which statements offered by a party will be admitted and
which will be excluded, and much evidence can be kept out of the
hearing by a party’s strategic choices.

See supra Sections II.C.2.iii, II.A.3.
See supra Section II.B.4.
355 See supra Section II.A.1.
356 See supra Section II.C.2.iii.
357 See supra Section II.C.2.i.
358 See supra Section II.C.3.
359 See supra Sections III.B., III.C.
360 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (providing for possible remote testimony and crossexamination).
361 See supra Section II.C.3.ii.
353
354
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IV. CONCLUSION
The new Title IX regulations adopt unprecedented standards for
admission of evidence in college hearings, in particular limiting
evidence to statements by parties and other persons who have fully
submitted to live cross-examination. Attorneys with experience in
school discipline, administrative hearings, or civil or criminal trials will
find a very different approach to evidence in Title IX hearings.
Complicating matters further, the new approach to admissibility of
evidence in Title IX hearings leaves many issues partially or fully
unresolved. Schools, their Title IX Coordinators, investigators, and
decision-makers, and the parties and their advisors have much to learn
about and try to puzzle out, and much to argue about in Title IX hearings.
Several pending lawsuits request invalidation of the new Title IX
regulations; President Biden criticized them as unfair to complainants
and proposed revised regulations are apparently forthcoming. At the
least, a new approach to the standards for admission of evidence in
school Title IX hearings is required. The current approach lacks basic
clarity, is not required to provide due process, fails to treat respondents
and complainants equally, and is not responsive to the realities of school
hearings and decision-makers.
Simply put, under the current
evidentiary approach and its many deficiencies, it is not clear that filing
a formal complaint is a good option for a college victim of sexual
misconduct. Wholesale reconsideration of the evidentiary approach of
the new regulations is appropriate.

